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SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS FOR SPOUSES*
Peter W. Martint
The fundamental problem with the current social security system
is its inability to cope with the employment patterns of the majority
of women, who are neither full-time homemakers nor full-time
employees.
Staff Memorandum, Justice Department Task Force on Sex Discrimination.'
Social security is not something that is dealt with once and for all
by just one bill. We will be voting on social security bills around here
as long as we are Members of this body, I would think.
Senator Russell B. Long on the floor of the Senate, December 15, 1977.2
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INTRODUCTION
Revision of the Social Security Act had high priority during
the first session of the 95th Congress. In May 1977, President
Carter proposed a set of amendments for restoring both the short-
and long-term balance between the program's income and expen-
ditures.3 The proposed amendments provoked widespread dis-
agreement over means, but nearly unanimous assent that prompt
legislative action was required. By the end of the year, Congress
had passed and the President had signed the Social Security
Amendments of 1977. 4
From start to finish, a few highly controversial issues drew
heavy public and congressional attention. 5 In contrast, one impor-
tant item in the President's original package-revision of spouse-
benefit provisions-attracted little attention. In part, that seems to
have been by design; the President's May message minimized the
significance of this revision.6 Two months later, however, in an ap-
' See President's Message to the Congress Proposing Measures To Restore the Financial
Integrity of the System, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 683 (May 9, 1977). The bill
containing the President's proposals (H.R. 8218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)) was intro-
duced in the House roughly two months later by Congressman James A. Burke, Chairman
of the Subcommittee on Social Security of the House Ways and Means Committee.
I Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1509 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 42 U.S.C.A.
(West Supp. 1978)).
' Such proposals included the use of general revenues to offset part of the program's
deficit, the removal or substantial relaxation of the retirement test, the inclusion of federal
and state employees within the system, and the use of different wage bases to calculate the
Social Security earnings tax paid by employer and employee.
6 The message spoke simply of correcting "certain technical provisions of the Social
Security Act which differentiate on the basis of sex," and adding "a new eligibility test for
dependent benefits." President's Message to the Congress Proposing Measures To Restore
the Financial Integrity of the System,-supra note 3, at 685.
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parent effort to elicit greater support, the administration billed the
same proposals as the "Social Security Equal Rights Amendments
of 1977. ' '7 The new label failed to push dependent benefits into the
spotlight, and spouse-benefit revision remained an important but
little noticed issue.
The administration's proposed new eligibility test for depen-
dents found little congressional support and some intense opposi-
tion.8 As a consequence, it fell out of the bill at an early point.
Nonetheless, nearly all parties to the legislative deliberations
agreed that the dependent-benefit provisions required modifica-
tion and, more broadly, that benefit equality for women was an
important and timely issue. In one form or another, the matter
received attention in both House and Senate. The lack of any sim-
ple resolution to this "problem," however, together with its rela-
tively low political visibility and the tight timetable on which the
1977 amendments moved, led Congress finally to make only a few
scattered changes in the dependent-benefit provisions. 9
7 H.R. 8218, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 301 (1977).
8 To prevent windfall spouse benefits to nondependent husbands and widowers (see
text accompanying notes 102-08 infra), the administration's bill imposed a test of actual
dependency-measured by earnings over the preceding three-year period-on both men
and women claiming spouse benefits. Opponents argued that this would arbitrarily cut off
benefits to many deserving women. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 1, at 565-87.
9 Congress created an offset for pensions from uncovered public employment (see text
accompanying notes 106-08 infra), dropped the remarriage penalty for most dependents 60
and over, and reduced the years-of-marriage requirement for divorced wives from 20 years
to 10. The latter two changes do not take effect until January 1, 1979. See Social Security
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, §§ 334, 336, 337, 91 Stat. 1509 (to be codified
in 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 416, 426).
The 1977 amendments increase the availability and value of spouse benefits to a mod-
est number of women, but make no pretense of providing full benefit equality. Congress
not only deferred more comprehensive review, but even put off the essentially symbolic
step of removing all remaining explicit sex differentiation from the program. Instead, it
turned to that common technique for dealing with hard questions-a study. The Act di-
rects the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, "in consultation with the Task
Force on Sex Discrimination in the Department of Justice," to undertake
a detailed study . . .of proposals to eliminate dependency as a factor in the de-
termination of entitlement to spouse's benefits ... , and of proposals to bring
about equal treatment for men and women in any and all respects under such
program, taking into account the practical effects (particularly the effect upon
women's entitlement to such benefits) of factors such as-
(1) changes in the nature and extent of women's participation in the labor
force,
(2) the increasing divorce rate, and
(3) the economic value of women's work in the home.
Id. § 341 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 902 note (West Supp. 1978)). Even before the Act
directed such a study, the administration had announced it would establish an HEW Task
Force on the treatment of women under Social Security. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1977, at
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The administration's proposal and Congress's response were
not simply a product of the current social and political attention to
the status of women; they followed directly from recent legal de-
velopments. In March 1977, the Supreme Court had struck down
as unconstitutional the more important sex-based Social Security
spouse-benefit differences.' Regardless of the constitutional merit
of those decisions, their cost impact spurred legislative action."
HEW Secretary Joseph A. Califano, Jr., presented the administra-
tion's dependent-benefit amendments as a necessary response to an
immediate problem created by the Supreme Court. 12
Those pressing most vigorously for equal treatment for
women were themselves displeased with the Social Security status
quo, even as altered by the Supreme Court. These proponents
argued that sexually neutral treatment under Social Security would
not be achieved by constitutional litigation or by legislative meas-
ures that merely desexed the benefit provisions.' 3 The current
criteria for Social Security entitlement, when applied to the differ-
ent average work-lives of men and women, assure that even remov-
ing all gender-based distinctions would still leave the system paying
women inferior benefits far into the future. Characteristically,
Congress submitted this question of benefit improvement for
women to a study,' 4 while acting swiftly on the cost problem
created by the 1977 Supreme Court decisions.' 5
38, col. 5. That group's report outlines the major issues and analyzes the diverse plans for
dealing with them proposed by individuals or groups outside HEW. See HEW, REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON THE TREATMENT OF WOMEN UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as HEW TASK FORCE REPORT]. Its release for comment in March 1978 constituted
a first stage of the six-month statutory study. See id. at 72; 43 Fed. Reg. 10,734 (1978).
10 Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Califano v. Silbowitz, 430 U.S. 924
(1977), aff'g mem. 397 F. Supp. 862 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Califano v. Jablon, 430 U.S. 924
(1977), affg mem. 399 F. Supp. 118 (D. Md. 1975). These decisions and their 1975 pre-
decessor, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), are discussed at text accompany-
ing notes 76-97 infra.
11 By invalidating an actual-dependency test that the Act specified for men only, the
Court opened benefit claims estimated at $3.4 billion through 1982, thus adding significant
financial stress to an already troubled system. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY
OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 95th CONG., IST SESS., BACKGROUND MATE-
RIALS FOR HEARINGS ON SOCIAL SECURITY 33 (Comm. Print 1977); 1977 Hearings, supra
note 1, at 10. Moreover, many persons granted benefits by the decisions did not seem
deserving, most conspicuously, retired male public employees who were not and never had
been financially dependent on their wives.
12See 1977 Hearings, supra note 1, at 10.
13 See id. at 565-87, 592-618, 623-25.
14 See note 9 supra.
15 See text accompanying notes 106-08 infra.
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A few basic facts about the program's structure demonstrate
why true Social Security benefit equality between men and women
is so difficult to achieve and how spouse benefits relate to that
problem. Two separate routes to entitlement exist: through one's
own prior covered employment and through the prior covered
work of a family member, most commonly a spouse or parent.
Primary benefits, based on one's own work, become available upon
retirement (as measured by advanced age and low earnings), or
earlier in the event of total disability. Secondary benefits, arising
from another's work, are paid to "dependents" or "dependent sur-
vivors" of covered workers. Those eligible include several
categories of both children and adults. Among adult dependents,
spouses are by far the most numerous.
The Social Security Act currently provides secondary benefits
to the wives or widows of covered workers who retire, become
disabled, or die. To qualify, a woman must have been married to
the worker for a minimum period and must be old, disabled (and
at least fifty), or caring for children under eighteen. If a wife's or
widow's primary retired-worker or disability benefits equal or ex-
ceed her secondary-benefit entitlement, she receives only the pri-
mary benefits.
Men can also qualify for benefits based solely on their status as
husband or widower of a worker; but spouse benefits go over-
whelmingly to women. 16 Table 1 indicates the relative importance
of primary and secondary benefits to men and women. Nearly all
adult male beneficiaries receive primary benefits, but almost half of
adult female beneficiaries receive secondary benefits. 17 Average
monthly payments to male retired workers are substantially higher
than those to female retired workers, spouses of male retired
workers, or widows.
16 Close to 8 million wives and widows currently receive secondary benefits; in contrast,
fewer than 100,000 husbands and widowers collect such benefits. While the latter figure
may grow modestly as a consequence of the recent Supreme Court decisions (see text ac-
companying notes 76-97 infra), spouse benefits and the eligibility requirements surround-
ing them will long continue to be of much greater importance to women than to men.
7 See HEW TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 11-12:
In 1975, 93 percent of elderly men and 51 percent of elderly women received
social security benefits as retired workers. . . . The women include 11 percent
who received higher dependents' benefits in addition to their retired-worker ben-
efits and 40 percent who received only retired-worker benefits. Most of the re-
maining 49 percent of elderly women were entitled to benefits as dependent wives
or widows.
1978]
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TABLE 1
Adult Social Security Beneficiaries by Sex
and Benefit Type, December 1976
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Men Women
N $ N $
Primary:
Retired Workers 9,420,659 247.70 7,744,756 197.08
Disabled Workers 1,842,468a 827,776a
Total 11,263,127 8,573,532
Secondary:
Spouses of Retired Workers
-without childrenb 6 ,9 9 6 d 106.63 2,686,234 116.90
-with childrenc 
_ _ 203,060 77.80
Spouses of Disabled Workers
-without childrenb 5 5 0 d 65.45 69,355 86.35
-with childrenc 
_ 
_ 404,004 70.69
Surviving Spouses
-without childrenb 3,278 187.92 3,991,743 207.14
-with childrenc 
____e 
_ 578,780e 159.78
Total 10,824e 7,933,176e
N = Number receiving benefits.
$ = Average monthly benefit.
Sources: Current Operating Statistics, SEC. SEC. BULL., Sept. 1977, Table M-12, at
38; Quarterly Statistics, SOC. SEC. BULL., Sept. 1977, Table Q-4 to Q-7, at 66-68,
Table Q-9, at 70; Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, Table
98, at 129.
a Derived from the December 1976 total using the 1975 male/female ratio.
b Spouses eligible by virtue of age.
Younger spouses eligible because of eligible children.
d This figure represents all husbands receiving that type of secondary benefit.
e Prior to 1975, benefits were not payable to younger widowers caring for eligible
children. The Supreme Court's decision in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975), changed that (see text accompanying notes 76-83 infra). By December
1976, there were several thousand such widowers receiving benefits. The Social
Security Administration includes them with the far more numerous younger
widows receiving benefits; hence the female figure is too large by a few thousand
and the male too small. In December 1975, there were 3,727 younger widowers
receiving benefits. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, HEW, RESEARCH &
STATISTICS NOTE No. 20 (Oct. 26, 1976).
Under present circumstances, any major effort to improve ben-
efits for women must involve modification of the spouse-benefit
provisions, but the path of reform is far from clear. Recent pro-
posals range from increasing the value and availability of such sec-
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ondary benefits,' 8 to abolishing them. 19
This Article focuses on the law that governs entitlement to and
the amount of spouse benefits, tracing the present statutory provi-
sions from their origin through 1977. It considers why spouse ben-
efits continue to have such major importance for women despite
substantial gains in female participation in the labor force. Al-
though this study does not fully investigate alternative means of
improving Social Security benefits for women, it does attempt to
illuminate that larger issue by exploring the inherent limitations of
dependent benefits as a means to that end. Comparison with a
differing approach to marriage and benefits, modeled on state
community-property law, highlights those limitations.
I
THE ORIGIN OF SPOUSE BENEFITS
Originally, Social Security did not include spouse benefits. The
Social Security Act of 1935 tied benefit entitlement rather closely to
contribution; the program paid benefits only to retired workers
(male or female) or, upon death, to the worker's estate. 20 In 1939,
however, acting on the recommendation of the Social Security
Board, 21 Congress relaxed the benefit-contribution relationship in
" For example, the Social Security package put forward by House Republicans in Sep-
tember 1977 contained a working-spouse's benefit proposal. See H.R. 9595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 301 (1977), described in 123 CONG. REC. H12,983 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977). That
package included two other examples of this approach, which, in modified form, were
among the 1977 amendments passed by Congress: a reduction in the duration-of-marriage
requirement for spouse-benefit eligibility by divorced women, and the elimination, for most
spouse beneficiaries, of the cutoff or reduction in benefits upon remarriage. See Social
Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, §§ 336, 337, 91 Stat. 1509 (to be
codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 416).
" See R. CAMPBELL, SOCIAL SECURITY: PROMISE AND REALITY 309-11 (1977).
20 The amount paid to the worker's estate, like the monthly retired-worker benefit, was
based upon the total of covered wages on which contribution (tax) had been paid. The Act
directed payment of a full 3.5% of such total covered wages to the estate of a worker who
died before collecting old age benefits; 3.5% minus the total of monthly payments received
before death, to the estate of a deceased retired worker. Social Security Act of 1935, ch.
531, § 203, 49 Stat. 620. Compared to the present law, the simplicity of the 1935 legislation
is overwhelming: the Old Age Insurance provisions took up less than four pages. For a
good summary, see SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA 222-26 (1937).
2" The 1939 amendments, with few exceptions, embodied the recommendations con-
tained in a report of the Social Security Board. See SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, PROPOSED
CHANGES IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT (1939) [hereinafter cited as Soc. SEC. BD. PROPOSED
CHANGES], reprinted in Social Security: Hearings Relative to the Social Security Act Amendments of
1939 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1939) [hereinafter
cited as 1939 Hearings]; Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360.
1978]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:789
several ways, including the addition of secondary benefits.22 The
amendments of that year established "supplemental payments" to
aged wives of retired workers to "take account of [the] greater
presumptive need of the married couple without requiring investi-
gation of individual need. '23 On similar "welfare" grounds, the
amendments substituted survivor benefits to aged widows and chil-
dren for lump-sum payments to the worker's estate. 24
An acute short-term economic and political problem-the ex-
tremely low payout and coverage of Social Security during its
infancy-motivated enactment of these measures; they were
thought to possess limited long-range importance: "Since in the
course of time many women will have developed substantial benefit
rights based upon their own past earnings, the cost of providing
the supplement for dependent wives [and widows should] gradu-
ally decline, and eventually the additional cost [should] be reduced
to a relatively small amount. 12 5 The inequities thus created-single
workers and two-worker couples contributed no less and sometimes
more than one-worker couples, yet reaped no advantage from the
new classes of benefits-seemed a small matter at a time when the
Social Security tax was only one percent of the first $3,000 of
annual wages. 26
The Board's recommendations, in turn, closely tracked those of a 1938 Advisory
Council on Social Security. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, FINAL REPORT, S.
Doc. No. 4, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1938), reprinted in 1939 Hearings, supra at 18.
22 The shift in the retired-worker benefit formula-from a total contribution basis to
an average covered-wages basis-had the effect of improving immediate payout by relaxing
the benefit-contribution relationship. See SOC. SEC. BD. PROPOSED CHANGES, supra note 21,
at 5-6. See generally A. ALTMEYER, THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 96-117
(1966).
23 SOC. SEC. BD. PROPOSED CHANGES, supra note 21, at 4. Although eligible retired
workers could be of either sex, these spouse benefits were exclusively for "aged wives."
24 The Social Security Board's report argued for the substitution in these terms:
Under a social insurance system the primary purpose should be to pay benefits in
accordance with the presumptive needs of the beneficiaries, rather than to make
payments to the estate of a deceased employee regardless of whether or not he
leaves dependents. The payment of monthly benefits to widows and orphans, who
are the two chief classes of dependent survivors, would furnish much more sig-
nificant protection than does the payment of lump-sum benefits.
Id. at 6.
In addition to providing for wives and widows, the amendments created dependent
and survivor benefits for children of a contributor and survivor benefits for financially
dependent elderly parents (the latter only if no wife or eligible children survived). Social
Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 201, 53 Stat. 1360 (adding § 202(c), (f)).
25 SoC. SEC. BD. PROPOSED CHANGES, supra note 21, at 4. The Senate Finance Commit-
tee expressed the same view. See S. REP. No. 734, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1939) (accom-
panying H.R. 6635). See also 1939 Hearings, supra note 21, at 1014, 1218.
26 The 1939 amendments halted a scheduled increase to 1.5%. See Social Security Act
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Anticipating objections to secondary benefits on the ground
that "presumptive need" should not shape entitlement, the Social
Security Board argued that the program already reflected a con-
cern for relative need.27 The Board suggested that providing new
dependent and survivor benefits and revising the retired-worker
benefit formula did not violate the contributory or "insurance"
character of the system so long as a "reasonable relationship ...
between benefits payable and past earnings ' 28 was maintained. The
Board found no offense to this "reasonable relationship" test in the
additional wife benefits because everyone, married or single,
would, for the immediate future, receive more than they had con-
tributed.2 9 The 1939 amendments also set a maximum on the total
monthly benefits payable on a particular worker's account. That
ceiling, today termed the "family maximum," limited the degree of
unfairness to individual contributors resulting from the new sec-
ondary benefits. 30
In light of the current controversy over Social Security financ-
ing it is worth noting how Congress planned to finance the incre-
ments of greater "adequacy" added in 1939. Initially, the large
imbalance between taxes and benefits provided a ready source of
funds; the amendments were in large part a response to that
surplus. But what of the future, when a significant percentage of
the retired population would draw benefits? The Board's 1939 re-
port dealt candidly with this issue:
The tax provisions embodied in the present law would probably
cover the increased annual cost for the first 15 years. They would
also probably provide a small reserve, which would be invested
and earn some interest. But when future annual benefit dis-
of 1935, ch. 531, § 801, 49 Stat. 620; Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666,
§ 601, 53 Stat. 1360. Congress similarly deferred subsequent scheduled tax increases until
1950, when the tax rate rose to 1.5%. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch.
809, § 201, 64 Stat. 477 (now I.R.C. § 3101).
27 The original legislation provided greater payments-in relation to contribution-for
beneficiaries with low wages and few years of covered employment before retirement. See
Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 202(a), 49 Stat. 620.
28 Soc. SEC. BD. PROPOSED CHANGES, supra note 21, at 2.
29 The Board put it this way: "In order that greater social adequacy may not be
achieved at the expense of individual equity, the Board recommends that the benefits pay-
able to unmarried persons continue to be at least as much as they could purchase from a
commercial insurance company with their own contributions." Id. at 4-5.
30 That maximum was (a) twice the wage earner's primary insurance amount, (b) 80%
of his average monthly wage, or (c) $85, whichever was least. Social Security Act Amend-
ments of 1939, ch. 666, § 201, 53 Stat. 1360 (adding § 203(a)). See text accompanying notes
122-24 infra.
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bursements exceeded annual tax collections plus interest earn-
ings, some other provision would have to be made for the funds
which, under the existing plan [established by the 1935 Act],
would be secured from interest on accumulated reserves. It
would then be necessary to do one of two things: increase the
pay-roll tax, or provide for the deficiency out of other general
taxes.
31
The original terms governing wife and widow benefits left lit-
tle doubt that Congress intended them to meet a presumed loss of
income caused by the retirement or death of a husband rather than
as an expression of the notion that a wife had a stake in her hus-
band's earnings. Eligibility hinged on marriage at the time of the
worker's retirement or death, not during the period in which he
built up his Social Security wage account."2 To qualify in accord-
ance with the presumptive need rationale, a woman had to show
she was living with her husband or at least financially dependent
on him.3 3 Regardless of her age, a wife could receive spouse ben-
efits only when her husband was old enough to receive retired-
worker benefits and had, in fact, retired and applied.34 Divorce
ended a wife's entitlement; remarriage ended a widow's.3 5 And
each dollar of retired-worker benefits a woman was eligible to re-
ceive on her own account displaced a dollar of these need-premised
spouse benefits. 36
On the other hand, it then seemed obvious that most eligible
wives and widows would have been married to the covered worker
during the period in which he earned his primary benefits. 37 The
31 SOC. SEC. BD. PROPOSED CHANGES, supra note 21, at 12.
32 Of course, for the first wave of retirees, marriage during the years immediately
prior to retirement did correspond to the period of covered employment. To qualify as a
wife at 65, a woman had to be married to the worker before he turned 60. Shorter mar-
riages were recognized for those married as of January 1, 1939, or bearing children of the
worker. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 201, 53 Stat. 1360 (adding
§ 209(i)). A widow had to be married for a year or the mother of a child of the deceased
worker. Id. (adding § 2090)).
33 Section 201 limited wife benefits to those "living with" a husband receiving retired-
worker benefits (id. (adding § 202(b))), but also provided: "A wife shall be deemed to be
living with her husband if they are both members of the same household, or she is receiv-
ing regular contributions from him toward her support, or he has been ordered by any
court to contribute to her support . Id. (adding § 209(n)). Identical limits applied to
widows.
3 4 Id. (adding § 202(b)).
15 Id. (adding § 202(b)(1), (d)(1), (e)(1)).
36 Id. (adding § 202(b)(2), (d)(2), (e)(2)).
37 Covered wages for retired workers began in 1937. A wife qualified for dependent
benefits if she was married prior to January 1, 1939. See id. (adding § 209(i)). There cannot
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new secondary benefits reflected, ever so slightly, a notion of
shared contribution. Rather than adding a single uniform payment
for dependent wives and surviving widows (which would have
typified a need-oriented or "welfare" approach), the benefit for-
mula set individual amounts proportionate to the retired-worker
benefits a woman's husband could claim at sixty-five. A dependent
wife was entitled to fifty percent of her husband's benefits; a
widow, seventy-five percent. 38 Despite frequent references then, as
now, to "the couple's benefit" or to "a supplement for married
men," the secondary benefits established in 1939 truly belonged to
the eligible spouse. The male retired worker received his benefit;
his eligible wife received her own.3 9 However, the number of
points at which the wife's eligibility rested on the covered worker's
status-including matters largely within his control-significantly
qualified this independence.
During their first decade, wife and widow benefits proved to
be expedient need-focused or antipoverty measures. Although the
male-female ratio was more closely balanced than at present, even
during the forties elderly women outnumbered elderly men.40
Very few older women had enough recent employment (post-1936)
to qualify for Social Security retired-worker benefits. 4 ' Poverty was
have been many workers retiring during the early forties who married their wives after
January 1937 but before January 1939.
3 8 d. (adding § 202(b)(2), (d)(2), (e)(2)).
39 Even where a marriage resulted in separation, the wife could meet the "living with"
requirement provided she met one of two support tests. See note 33 supra.
40 The 1940 census reported 4,613,194 women 65 and over and 4,406,120 men. See
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2 SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1940-POPULATION, PART 1, Table 8, at 27 (1943). The proportion of elderly
women to elderly men has grown steadily since. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF AGING AND THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 12-14 (Current Population Reports, Special Studies, Series P-23, No. 59, 1976).
41 For 1938, the ratio of male to female workers with taxable wages was 2.6 to 1. And
many more male than female workers were close to retirement. See SOCIAL SECURITY
BOARD, SOCIAL SECURITY YEARBOOK 1939, at 54-55 (1940).
In 1940, the first year in which monthly benefits were payable-as a consequence of
the 1939 amendments-the ratio of male to female retired-worker benefit recipients was
7.9 to 1. A 6.5 to I ratio prevailed among recipients who had just turned 65. See SOCIAL
SECURITY BOARD, SOCIAL SECURITY YEARBOOK 1940, at 158 (1941).
In 1939, slightly more than 20% of all women 14 years of age and over held jobs,
compared to approximately 66% of all men. The disparity was far greater among women
and men within a few years of age 65. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
2 SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940-PoPULATION, PART 1, Table 16, at 44
(1943); BUREAU OF THE qENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1940-PoPULATION, THE LABOR FORCE: EMPLOYMENT AND PERSONAL
CHARACTERISTICS, Table 1, at 17-18 (1943).
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so prevalent among the elderly that any program paying benefits to
those 65 and over could reasonably have been called an antipoverty
measure.42 Poverty hit hardest among elderly women, 43 particu-
larly widows. 4 4
Under these circumstances, paying secondary benefits to wives
and widows of Social Security contributors seemed a sensible way to
provide limited amounts of monthly income to a class of needy
people. In 1942, for example, only 13,000 women qualified for
retired-worker benefits, compared to 87,000 men. 45 Wife benefits
permitted an additional 33,000 elderly women to qualify for pay-
ments; 15,000 elderly widows collected on the accounts of their
deceased husbands, and 32,000 widows under 65 were eligible be-
cause of young children of deceased workers.46 Because payments
were small, 47 the few cases where presumed need did not in fact
exist represented neither serious fiscal waste to the system nor
large windfall to the recipient.
Even with the new benefits, Social Security reached less than
42 The federal government did not measure poverty in 1940, but the poverty rate
among the elderly was certainly very high. At the time, the elderly represented the most
obvious and attractive target for public antipoverty measures. See SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD,
SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA 149-54 (1937).
In December 1940, 25% of those 65 and over had qualified for and were receiving
Old Age Assistance, federal-state need-tested benefits for the elderly established by Title I
of the Social Security Act of 1935. See SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, SOCIAL SECURITY YEARBOOK
1940, at 274 (1941). Many were rejected or deterred from applying by relative responsibil-
ity provisions, asset disqualifications, and the like; many more lived in states with minimal
OAA programs. Thus the 25% figure represents only a small portion of those "poor" by
any reasonable national income or income-and-asset measure for 1940.
3 In the 1940's, like today, over half the women age 65 and over were widows. See
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, Part 1, at 20 (1975). See generally Sanders, Family Compo-
sition in the United States, Soc. SEC. BULL., April 1939, at 9, 11-12.
In 1975, more than half the women 65 and over were widowed, and more than one-
third were living alone. By contrast 3 out of 4 men 65 and over were married and living
with their (often younger) wives. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF AGING AND THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 45
(Current Population Reports, Special Studies, Series P-23, No. 59, 1976).
" The initial Old Age Assistance rolls showed significant over-representation of
widowed women. See Sex, Marital Status, and Living Arrangements of 1,000,000 Recipients of
Old-Age Assistance, Soc. SEC. BULL., Feb. 1939, at 20, 20-25.
4 See SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, SOCIAL SECURITY YEARBOOK 1942, Table 86, at 133
(1943). The figures are for workers awarded retired-worker benefits during 1942, not for
total beneficiaries.
4 6 See id., Tables 89-90, at 135.
47 In 1942, monthly payments averaged $12.46 for wives and $20.05 for widows. See
id. at 51, 58. Recall that a wife received half her husband's primary insurance amount
(P.I.A.); a widow, three quarters. The average monthly benefit for young widows eligible
because of children in their care was $19.56 per month. See id. at 58.
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twenty percent of the nation's elderly by the end of the forties (see
Figure 1). Without benefits for dependent and surviving spouses,
the program's payments in 1949 would have diminished by nearly
one quarter and the number of beneficiaries by an even larger
fraction.48
TABLE 2
Aged Social Security Beneficiaries by Sex
and Benefit Type, 1950-1974
All Soc. Sec.
Populationab Benefxiarib Retired-Worker Benefitsa.b
Men Women Men Women
% % N % N
1950 5,857 6,541 16 25 (1,469) 5 (302)
1960 7,542 9,133 62 69 (5,217) 27 (2,487)
1970 8,405 11,680 86 85 (7,111) 43 (5,010)
1974 8,966 12,849 88 90 (8,046) 49 (6,285)
Average Monthly Surviving-Spousea'e
Retired-Worker Benefits Spouse Benefitsa" Benefits
Ratio
Men Women WomenlMen Men Women Men Women
1950 $45.67 $35.05 .77 1 499 - 314
1960 81.87 59.67 .73 15 2,144 2 1,542
1970 130.53 101.22 .78 8 2,492 3 3,175
1974 206.56 165.47 .80 8 2,626 3 3,674
Sources: BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARAC-
TERISTICS OF THE OLDER POPULATION, 1974, Table 1, at 3 (Current Population Reports,
Series P-23, No. 57, 1975); Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975,
Table 23, at 57, Table 84, at 121, Table 85, at 122, Table 100, at 131, Table 107, at 136.
For the latest statistics, see HEW, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE TREATMENT OF
WOMEN UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY, Tables 9-10, at 91-92 (1978).
a Numbers in thousands.
b Figures represent those 65 years old and older.
c Figures represent those receiving either primary or secondary benefits.
d Figures represent those 62 years old and older receiving benefits based on the ac-
count of a retired worker.
e Figures represent those 60 years old and older.
48 The precise reduction in payment would have been 23.7%: 9% for wives, 8.9% for
elderly widows, and 5.8% for young widows with children. See Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL
STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1949, Sept. 1950, Table 19, at 35.
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II
THE FAILURE OF RETIRED-WORKER BENEFITS
TO DISPLACE SPOUSE BENEFITS
Contrary to congressional expectations on enactment, spouse
benefits have remained significant even as more women have be-
come eligible for retired-worker benefits on their own account.
Labor force participation by women has risen steadily since 1939,49
yet spouse benefits have continued to grow in recipient number
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49 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATISTICS 1975-REFERENCE EDITION, Table 2, at 30. See also Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL
STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, Table 39, at 72 [hereinafter cited as 1975 ANN. SUPP.].
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and total dollar amount (see Table 2).5 0 Many of the reasons for
this paradoxical phenomenon could not have been foreseen in
1939. Under the 1939 formula, a woman retiring at age 65 in 1949
had only to have earned average monthly wages of $37.00 for 12
years to receive benefits on her own account, so long as she was
married to the average male beneficiary retiring the same year.51
50 See generally Reno, Women Newly Entitled to Retired Worker Benefits: Survey of New Ben-
eficiaries, Soc. SEC. BULL., Apr. 1973, at 3; Thompson, Aged Women OASDI Benefliaries:
Income and Characteristics, 1971, Soc. SEC. BULL., Apr. 1977, at 23.
"' The average monthly benefits awarded male retirees in 1949 were $29.41. See 1975
ANN. Supp., supra note 49, Table 62, at 93. To equal the wife benefits payable on such a
primary amount, a woman needed retired-worker benefits of $14.71 which in turn re-
FIGURE 2
11950
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The average monthly wages of a female worker in manufacturing
in 1939 were almost twice that amount.52 The gradual disappear-
ance of spouse benefits was thus a reasonable prediction assuming
stable wage levels and no revisions of the benefit formula.
Events soon upset these underlying assumptions. From 1940
on, wages and prices rose steadily and, beginning in 1950, Con-
gress responded with periodic revisions of the benefit formula. 53
Each revision increased retired-worker benefits and produced
proportionate increases for secondary-benefit recipients. The rela-
tionship that evolved between the two types of benefits differed
substantially from that contained in the 1939 legislation. In addi-
tion, the same motivations that led to the creation of dependent
and survivor benefits later induced Congress to liberalize the terms
on which secondary benefits were awarded. Congress passed at
least ten such amendments between 1950 and 1977.
In 1950, for example, Congress granted wife benefits to
younger wives caring for eligible children of retired workers, and
extended survivor benefits to divorced former wives caring for
children of deceased workers.5 4 A 1956 amendment reduced from
sixty-five to sixty-two the age at which women could collect wife or
widow benefits (without having young children in their care), or
retired-worker benefits.55 For widows, a 1965 amendment reduced
the age to sixty;56 two years later it was dropped to fifty for totally
disabled widows. 57
quired average monthly wages of about $37.00. See Social Security Act Amendments of
1939, ch. 666, § 201, 53 Stat. 1360 (adding § 209(e)).
To qualify for retired-worker benefits, however, a woman (or man) had to be "fully
insured." As then defined, such status was hard to achieve if a person spent significant
time, between January 1, 1937, and retirement, in uncovered employment, which included
military service or working in the home. This requirement, modified in 1950, tended to
undercut the prediction that retired-worker benefits would gradually displace spouse ben-
efits. See E. WITTE, SOCIAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVES 33 (1962).
5 2 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, Series D 830-844, at 172 (1975). For the period
1937-1948 a woman worker steadily employed at the average wage for such workers
earned an average monthly wage of $114.17. See id.
'
3See 1975 ANN. Supp., supra note 49, at 18-19.
54 Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, § 101(a), 64 Stat. 477 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 402(b), (g) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
5- Social Security Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, § 102(a), 70 Stat. 807 (current version
at 42 U.S.C. § 402(a), (b), (e) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). For men, 65 remained the threshold
until 1961. See Social Security Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-64, § 102, 75 Stat. 131
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 402(a), (c), (f) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
5 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 307, 79 Stat. 286
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1)(B) (1970)).
5 Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 104, 81 Stat. 821
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Congress dropped the "living with" requirement for both
wives and widows in 1957, leaving marital status the sole test of
"dependency"; the marital status definition was also clarified
slightly.58 Three years later, Congress again liberalized the wife-
and widow-benefit provisions. Legislation reduced the durational
requirement a wife had to meet from three years to one. 59 More-
over, a new purely federal test of marital status qualified those
who, though not legally married under state law, had gone through
a marriage ceremony in good faith. 60
In 1958, two years after adding disability benefits to Social
Security, Congress extended dependent benefits to spouses and
children of disabled workers on the same terms as it had to depen-
dents of retired workers. 6'
The 1939 amendments pegged wife benefits at 50% of the
worker's primary insurance amount and aged-widow benefits at
75%.62 In 1961, the latter figure was increased to 82.5% and in
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1)(B) (1970)). This amendment also applied to widowers,
but the qualifying age for nondisabled widowers remained 62 from 1961 until 1972, when
it became 60. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 107, 86 Stat.
1329 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975)).
"
5 See Act of Aug. 30, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-238, § 3, 71 Stat. 518 (current version at
42 U.S.C. § 402, 416 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). The original 1939 legislation left unclear
whether marital status, as determined for inheritance purposes under state law, sufficed
for eligibility or whether ability to inherit was required. See Kandelin v. Social Sec. Bd., 136
F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1943). The 1957 amendment removed the doubt by creating alternative
eligibility standards: married status under state law or the right to take personal property
under intestate succession laws of the state. For the background of that amendment, see
Rombauer, Marital Status and Eligibility for Federal Income Benefits: A Historical Survey, 52
WASH. L. REv. 227 (1977).
51 Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, § 207, 74 Stat. 924
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 416(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). The three-year test for wives, itself
a relaxation of the 1939 requirement (see note 37 supra), was the result of a 1946 amend-
ment. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1946, ch. 951, § 408, 60 Stat. 978. In 1967,
Congress reduced the durational test for widows and widowers from the one year set in
1960, to nine months. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 156, 81
Stat. 821 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 416(c), (g) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). In addition, a new
provision allowed for waiver of the durational test in the event of accidental death and in
certain other cases. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 416(k) (1970)). Congress modified this
waiver provision in 1972. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603,
§ 115(b),. 145(a), 86 Stat. 1329 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 416(k) (Supp. V 1975)). See generally
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 767-85 (1975).
6 0See Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, § 208, 74 Stat. 924
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(B) (1970)). For example, a woman who married without
knowledge of her husband's prior undissolved marriage could receive benefits.
"' See Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-840, § 205, 72 Stat. 1013
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
62 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 201, 53 Stat. 1360 (adding
§ 202(b)(2), (d)(2), (e)(2)).
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1972, to 100%.63
Finally, the 1965 amendments extended the equivalent of wife
and widow benefits to divorced women whose marriages had lasted
twenty years and who met a test of continuing actual dependency
on their former spouses. 64 Congress removed the actual-depen-
dency requirement in 1972,65 and reduced the durational require-
ment to ten years in 1977.66
These numerous amendments, combined with the growth in
Social Security coverage, made it increasingly easy for women to
qualify for spouse benefits. The dramatic improvement in basic
benefits and in the widow's entitlement as a percentage of the
primary insurance amount have substantially raised the value of
such secondary benefits. Although more women are qualifying for
retirement benefits (see Figure 1), the present retired-worker for-
mula, together with women's wage and work patterns, often keeps
those benefits below wife or widow entitlements (cf. Figure 2). Over
63 Social Security Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-64, § 104, 75 Stat. 131; Social
Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 102, 86 Stat. 1329 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 402(e)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1975)). Benefits for young widows caring for children have
remained constant at 75% since 1939. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(2) (1970).
Section 103 of the Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat.
821, imposed a $105 maximum on the monthly benefit payable to wives and husbands. At
the time, however, no one approached that level. Congress removed the maximum in
§ 1004 of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 402(b)(2), (c)(3) (1970)).
64 See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 308, 79 Stat. 286 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)(1), (e)(1), 416(d) (1970)). The Senate Finance Committee Report
offered this rationale for the new class of beneficiaries:
It is not uncommon for a marriage to end in divorce after many years, when
the wife is too old to build up a substantial social security earnings record even if
she can find a job....
These changes would provide protection mainly for women who have spent
their lives in marriages that are dissolved when they are far along in years-
especially housewives who have not been able to work and earn social security
benefit protection of their own ....
S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 107-08, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1943, 2047-48. Under the 1950 amendments, younger divorced wives caring for
eligible children of deceased wage-earners could receive the equivalent of mother benefits
without meeting the 20-year test. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, § 101,
64 Stat. 477 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). These
amendments did not give divorced spouses benefits equivalent to those paid younger wives
caring for children of retired or disabled workers. In Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181,
185-89 (1976), the Supreme Court held that this discrepancy in treatment did not violate
the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
65 Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 114, 86 Stat. 1329.
66 Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 337, 91 Stat. 1509 (to be
codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)(1)(G), 416(d)(1)-(2)).
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twenty percent of the women currently receiving retired-worker
benefits also receive secondary spouse benefits, compared to fif-
teen percent at the end of 1966 and less than ten percent at the
end of 1956 (see Table 3).
Behind the many spouse-benefit amendments lay no clear
scheme or consistent rationale. Indeed, Congress's incremental ap-
proach to modifying these provisions virtually guarantees that
"[no] particular amendment fits with mathematical nicety into a
carefully conceived overall plan for payment of benefits. 67
TABLE 3
Women Receiving Both Retired-Worker and Spouse Benefits
Year N a  %b
1952 35,402 6.0
1953 53,631 6.8
1954 77,978 8.0
1955 106,320 8.7
1956 140,603 9.1
1957 190,951 9.6
1958 225,790 9.8
1959 264,434 10.2
1960 302,646 10.6
1961 330,727 10.5
1962 421,535 12.1
1963 496,639 13.2
1964 571,144 14.2
1965 611,610 14.3
1966 699,080 15.1
1967 760,950 15.7
1968 831,760 16.3
1969 909,720 17.0
1970 966,780 17.1
1971 1,060,120 17.7
1972 1,170,286 18.5
1973 1,361,360 20.2
1974 1,516,326 21.3
1975 1,660,451 22.4
Source: Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, Table 91, at 125.
a Does not include those who receive no spouse benefits because their retired-
worker benefits exceed their potential secondary benefit entitlement.
b This figure represents women receiving both types of benefits as a percentage
of all women retired workers.
67 Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 225 (1977) (dissenting opinion, Rehnquist, J.).
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Nonetheless, taken together the amendments reflect two important
features of the spouse-benefit approach. First, because entitlement
to such benefits stems from a "presumed need" rather than a con-
tribution rationale, Congress has frequently succumbed to the ar-
gument that a particular group of women (or occasionally men)
excluded by existing eligibility rules should be included. The ar-
gument for their inclusion is simply that they are at least as deserv-
ing as those already receiving benefits. Because the line between
eligibility and ineligibility is demonstrably arbitrary, it has proven,
over time, to be particularly unstable.
Second, the post-1939 amendments seemed to respond to the
entanglement of spouse benefits in hard-to-manage factual and
legal questions. The dependent and dependent-survivor benefits
added in 1939 had proved complicated to administer. Eligibility
and benefit calculations for retired workers primarily required
proof of age and use of routinely collected wage records. In con-
trast, to determine eligibility for wife benefits required ascertaining
the validity of marriages and divorces under state law, and
scrutinizing living and support arrangements. As a result, these
secondary benefits accounted for a significant portion of Social
Security administrative appeals and litigation 68 before Congress in-
jected the more troublesome issue of "disability" into the system in
1956.69 Removal of the "living with" test for wives and widows in
1957 and the support test for divorced wives in 1972 eliminated
many difficult legal and factual issues.7 0 The 1960 addition of a
liberal federal definition of "spouse" also simplified marital status
68 See generally R. LEVY, T. LEwIS, & P. MARTIN, SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE INDIVIDUAL
174-75 (1971); Fooner & Francis, Relationship as a Problem in Old-Age and Survivors Insurance,
Soc. SEC. BULL., Aug. 1941, at 24.
69 Ever since the disability freeze and disability benefits were added to the Social Se-
curity program, the issue of disability has accounted for the overwhelming majority of
litigated claims (nearly three-fourths of the published district court Social Security decisions
from 1960 to 1965). Of the balance, spouse-benefit cases have represented a significant
fraction (one-fifth of the published district court nondisability Social Security decisions
from 1960 to 1965).
70 See notes 58 & 65 supra.
Until 1972, a divorced woman seeking benefits on her former husband's account had
to: (1) be receiving one-half her support from her former husband, (2) be receiving "sub-
stantial" contributions from him pursuant to written agreement, or (3) have a court order
for "substantial" contribution in effect. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(D), (e)(1)(D) (1970) (amended
1972). The third criterion became critical where the husband had ceased payments for a
period prior to death or retirement. For cases suggesting some of the difficulties of this
three-pronged test, see Gershman v. Finch, 454 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1971); Adair v. Finch,
421 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1970); Roop v. Richardson, 324 F. Supp. 1130 (W.D. Va. 1971);
Collins v. Finch, 311 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
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determination in some cases.7 '
Any conclusion about what the many spouse-benefit amend-
ments demonstrate is debatable; their cumulative effect, however,
is clear: they assured that spouse benefits would not "wither away."
III
SPOUSE BENEFITS FOR MEN AND CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY
Congress provided some secondary benefits to aged husbands
and widowers as early as 1950.72 Their entitlement, however, car-
ried a test of "actual dependency" on the wage earner more strin-
gent than any applied to wives or widows. 73 That test remained
after the 1957 amendments eliminated the requirement that wives
or widows either be living with or financially supported by their
husbands. 74 It remained after 1972, when Congress deleted the
requirement that divorced women be financially dependent on
their retired or deceased former husbands. 75 Thus, by 1975,
women received spouse benefits based solely on their marital status
at benefit time; men did not. In addition, certain spouse ben-
efits-principally benefits for divorced women and for young
widows caring for children of deceased wage earners (mother
benefits)-remained wholly unavailable to men.
In 1975, the Supreme Court began to chip away at this sex-
differentiated structure in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 76 holding that
Social Security had to furnish young widowers with benefits com-
parable to mother benefits. Two years later, the Court substantially
71 See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
72 Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, § 101, 64 Stat. 477 (current ver-
sion at 42 U.S.C. § 402(c), (f) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
73 To qualify, a husband or widower had to be "receiving at least one-half of his sup-
port, as determined in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Administrator [of
Social Security], from [his wife] at the time she became entitled to old-age insurance ben-
efits [or died]." Id. For a harsh application of the test, see Clark v. Celebrezze, 344 F.2d
479 (1st Cir. 1965) (widower who met support test when his wife turned 65, but not at time
of her death less than one year later, held ineligible).
Husband and widower benefits also required the wage earner to be both "fully" and
"currently insured"; wife and widow benefits required only "fully insured" status. In 1967,
Congress removed the requirement of "currently insured" status for husbands and widow-
ers. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 157, 81 Stat. 821 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 402(c), (f) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
74 See note 58 supra.
75 See note 65 supra.
76 420 U.S. 636 (1975). For an analysis of the law before Wiesenfeld, see Note, Sex
Classifications in the Social Security Benefit Structure, 49 IND. L.J. 181 (1974).
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completed the job in Califano v. Goldfarb,77 Califano v. Silbowitz,7 8
and Califano v. Jablon,79 ruling that Social Security must grant eld-
erly widowers and husbands spouse benefits on the same terms as
it does to widows and wives.80
In Wiesenfeld, the Court examined the benefits paid young
widows (but not young widowers) caring for children from both the
contribution and benefit side. On the contribution side, the distinc-
tion denied "women [workers the] protection for their families
which men receive as a result of their employment." 81 On the ben-
efit side, the Court rejected the view that benefits for young
widows with children implemented a "policy of cushioning the fi-
nancial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss
imposes a disproportionately heavy burden. '8 2 It interpreted
mother benefits as a measure focused on the welfare of children
rather than widows. This led directly to a finding of constitutional
invalidity: "Given the purpose of enabling the surviving parent to
remain at home to care for a child, the gender-based distinction of
§ 4 02(g) is entirely irrational. The classification discriminates
among surviving children solely on the basis of the sex of the
surviving parent. '83
Goldfarb posed a harder case for two reasons. First, aged
widowers could receive benefits (young widowers with children
could not) if they could show actual dependency. Second, the lack
of such a dependency test for widows could more easily be charac-
terized as "an attempt to provide for the special problems of wom-
en. ' 84 Nevertheless, by a 5 to 4 vote, 85 the Court held the differ-
ential treatment unconstitutional. The plurality opinion by Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Powell, focused
first, like Wiesenfeld, on the contribution side. It suggested, how-
7 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
78 430 U.S. 924 (1977), aff'g mem. 397 F. Supp. 862 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
79 430 U.S. 924 (1977), affg mem. 399 F. Supp. 118 (D. Md. 1975).
80 Although those decisions struck down the sex distinctions that had the greatest im-
pact on Social Security beneficiaries, many others still exist. For a full catalog, see HEW
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 75-76. The decisions also created interesting questions
about retroactive application. See Crumpler v. Califano, 443 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Va. 1978).
81 420 U.S. at 645.
82 Id. at 648 (quoting Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974)).
83 420 U.S. at 651.
84 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 653.
85 In dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart
and Blackmun, voted to uphold the distinction, viewing it as a permissible "classification
which favors aged widows." Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 242 (1977).
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ever, that analysis need not go further, that a provision denying
women wage earners the protection enjoyed by male contributors
to the system was necessarily infirm. s6 Yet the plurality did look at
the benefit side:
We conclude . . . that the differential treatment of nonde-
pendent widows and widowers results not, as [the Government]
asserts, from a deliberate congressional intention to remedy the
arguably greater needs of the former, but rather from an inten-
tion to aid the dependent spouses of deceased wage earners,
coupled with a presumption that wives are usually dependent....
The only conceivable justification for writing the presumption
of wives' dependency into the statute is the assumption, not ver-
ified by the Government. . . , but based simply on "archaic and
overbroad" generalizations . . . , that it would save the Govern-
ment time, money, and effort simply to pay benefits to all wid-
ows, rather than to require proof of dependency of both sexes.
We [hold] ... that such assumptions do not suffice to justify a
gender-based discrimination in the distribution of employment-
related benefits.87
Justice Stevens supplied the necessary fifth vote. His opinion,
like that of the dissenting Justices, focused on the benefit side since
he found no merit in the argument that the statute discriminated
against women contributors:
At the same salary level, all workers must pay the same tax,
whether they are male or female, married or single, old or
young, the head of a large family or a small one. The benefits
which may ultimately become payable to them or to a wide vari-
ety of beneficiaries-including their families, their spouses, fu-
ture spouses, and even their ex-wives-vary enormously, but
such variations do not convert a uniform tax obligation into an
unequal one.88
Justice Stevens concluded that the preferential treatment of widows
was neither the result of a considered effort by Congress to achieve
administrative ease nor "the product of a conscious purpose to
redress the 'legacy of economic discrimination' against females. ' 89
Instead, he found "that this discrimination [was] merely the acci-
86 Id. at 204-09.
8 1 Id. at 216-17 (footnote omitted).
88 1d. at 217-18 (concurring opinion).
89 d. at 221 (quoting Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 359 (1974) (dissenting opinion,
Brennan, J.)).
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dental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females." 90
Conceding that the same reasoning applied to the statute upheld in
Kahn v. Shevin, 91 Justice Stevens nevertheless considered the more
recent and factually closer Wiesenfeld case controlling. 92
Three weeks later, in Silbowitz93 and Jablon,94 the Court af-
firmed, without opinion, district court decisions that struck down
on fifth amendment grounds the requirement of actual depen-
dency imposed on husbands but not wives. The Court simulta-
neously upheld, in Califano v. Webster,95 the statutory formula that
allowed women retiring before 1972 to omit three more low-wage
years than men in calculating average monthly wages for retire-
ment benefit purposes. 96 The Court characterized that formula as
a permissible measure aimed at "redressing our society's longstand-
ing disparate treatment of women." '97
IV
THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO Goldfarb
By extending secondary benefits to men on the same terms
as to women, Goldfarb and the other husband-benefit cases high-
lighted a growing problem with that scheme. 98 The attenuated
chain of presumption it embodied-a presumption of need resting
upon a presumption of financial dependency on the covered
spouse's earnings which in turn rested upon marital status alone-
too often failed to match the facts. The payment of benefits to
those for whom the presumption of need and dependency was
invalid could no longer be dismissed, as it was in 1939, as involving
90 430 U.S. at 223.
91 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
92 Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 224.
3 430 U.S. 924 (1977), aff'g mem. 397 F. Supp. 862 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
94 430 U.S. 924 (1977), aff'g mem. 399 F. Supp. 118 (D. Md. 1975).
5 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam).
961d. at 314-16.
9 7 Id. at 317 (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 209 n.8). The four Justices who
dissented in Goldfarb concurred in Webster but doubted that any tenable distinction existed
between the two cases. 430 U.S. at 321 (concurring opinion, Burger, C.J.).
98 It is intriguing to speculate whether the 1939 wife- and widow-benefit provisions,
which had no equivalents for men, would have met the constitutional requirements of
equality reflected in these recent Supreme Court decisions. Their clearly discernible com-
pensatory purpose suggests that they would. Goldfarb and its progeny seem more the result
of post-1939 tinkering with the original scheme than a reaction to the concept of sex-
differentiated benefits for spouses.
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neither significant waste to the system nor major windfall to the
recipient. 99
Two features of the spouse-benefit provisions helped to con-
tain the problem. First, greatly expanded Social Security coverage
made it more likely that a wife's work outside the home would be
reflected in a Social Security wage record. Wives with sufficient
wage records to support retired-worker benefits received those
benefits, which then offset spouse benefits dollar for dollar. 00 Sec-
ond, the retirement test, applicable to both retired-worker and
spouse benefits, blocked benefits to those who were non-needy be-
cause of continuing earnings of their own or their spouses, at least
prior to age seventy-two. 10
Nonetheless, spouses who have never been financially depen-
dent on a covered worker can and do receive substantial spouse
benefits. That was true of some wives and widows before Goldfarb.
But the husband- and widower-benefit cases threatened the system
with a wave of new benefit claims, many of them from "nondepen-
dent" men who lacked Social Security retirement coverage of their
own, not because of insubstantial employment, but because they
had been covered by a public pension scheme other than Social
Security. (Federal employees and many state and local government
workers are still uncovered by Social Security.' 02 ) It was more than
99 For the month of March 1977, benefits paid to wives of retired workers totaled $331
million; for the same month widow benefits equaled $832 million. Husband and widower
benefits totaled less than $1 million. See Quarterly Statistics, Soc. SEc. BuLL., Dec. 1977, Ta-
bles Q-6, Q-9, at 77, 79.
100 Presently, Social Security covers over 90% of paid civilian employment. See 1975
ANN. Supp., supra note 49, Table 7, at 44. The Social Security offset provision is contained
in 42 U.S.C. § 402(k)(3)(A) (1970).
101 See 42 U.S.C. § 403(b) (1970). In 1977, Congress reduced to 70 the age at which
the retirement test drops out. See Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
216, § 302, 91 Stat. 1509 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 403) (effective with respect to
taxable years ending after Dec. 31, 1981).
102 The social security program now covers about 90 percent of the jobs in
paid employment. The largest group of jobs excluded from social security cover-
age is about 5.7 million jobs in public employment, most of which are covered
under public staff-retirement systems. (About 2.4 million jobs out of 2.7 million
jobs in Federal civilian employment are excluded from coverage. Out of 12.3 mil-
lion jobs in State and local employment, about 3 million jobs are not covered but
could be covered if the States elected coverage for these employees and 0.3 million
jobs are excluded from coverage.) In addition, some 210,000 jobs in employment
for nonprofit organizations are not covered but could be covered if the nonprofit
organizations elected to cover their employees. Most of the other jobs not covered
represent irregular or part-time work.
H.R. REP. No. 702, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 33-34, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4155, 4190-91.
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coincidental that all three men seeking spouse benefits in the cases
decided by the Supreme Court in March 1977 were retired federal
employees on pension. 10 3
Responding to Goldfarb, the administration proposed a new
test of actual dependency for all spouse benefits. That test would
have qualified only people who earned less than their spouses dur-
ing the three-year period immediately preceding the event trigger-
ing eligibility-retirement, death, or disability.' 0 4 Opponents ar-
gued that the proposal threatened to deprive many deserving
women of benefits. They noted that a three-year period of relative
earnings would often fail to reflect accurately the long-term
economic relationship of a marriage, especially since the critical
period under the test was likely to come between ages fifty-five and
sixty-five when the probability of health or employment problems
was high.'0 5
Congress substituted a narrower and less controversial pro-
vision. It offsets pensions from uncovered public employment
against secondary benefits in the same way the system has always
offset retired-worker benefits. The provision, which does not ex-
tend to spouse benefits already applied for, creates a reduction in
spouse benefits equal to
the amount of any monthly periodic benefit payable to such
[spouse] for such month which is based upon [his or] her earn-
ings while in the service of the Federal Government or any State
(or political subdivision thereof... ) if, on the last day [he or] she
was employed by such entity, such service [was not covered by
Social Security].' 06
Thus, an elderly civil servant's small or nonexistent Social Security wage record can be
a spectacularly untrustworthy indicator of need or dependency.
103 See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 203 (1977); Silbowitz v. Secretary of HEW,
397 F. Supp. 862, 864 (S.D. Fla. 1975), affd ,nem., 430 U.S. 924 (1977); Jablon v. Secretary
of HEW, 399 F. Supp. 113, 122 n.5 (D. Md. 1975), affd mem., 430 U.S. 924 (1977).
104 See H.R. 8218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 312 (1977).
105 See 1977 Hearings, supra note 1, at 571, 577.
106 Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 334(a)(2), (b)(2), (c)(2),
(d)(2), (e)(2), 91 Stat. 1509 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(b)(4)(A), (c)(2)(A), (e)(8)(A),
(f)(2)(A), (g)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1978)).
The 1975 Advisory Council recommended an offset for all pensions based on uncov-
ered work. See REPORTS OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY 38-39 (1975). In
two respects, that recommendation was more inclusive than the version Congress ultimately
enacted: (1) it applied to the small group of uncovered workers having pensions but not in
public employment (principally, retired employees of nonprofit organizations (see note 102
supra)), and (2) it apparently applied to pensions earned during a period of uncovered
work, even though the work with that employer later became covered before the individu-
al's retirement.
[Vol. 63:789
SPOUSE BENEFITS
Congress was primarily concerned with preventing a post-
Goldfarb flow of spouse benefits to "non-needy" male spouses. It
was also hesitant to upset the expectations of women facing immi-
nent retirement. For these reasons, the amendment defers the ef-
fective date of the offset provision for all women but for only a few
men. The sex distinction is drawn indirectly; an exception to the
new scheme applies to those who meet the requirements of the
spouse-benefit provisions as they were "in effect and being ad-
ministered in January 1977"-in other words, prior to Goldfarb,
Silbowitz, andJablon.10 7 No offset applies to such individuals if they
become entitled to pensions from uncovered public employment
during the five-year period following enactment. 0 8 Once the
phase-in period passes, spouse benefits will be limited to people
without comparable public retirement benefits, in the form of
either retired-worker benefits from work covered by Social Secu-
rity or pension benefits from public employment.
V
THE ESSENTIAL ARBITRARINESS OF SPOUSE BENEFITS
Blocking the flow of spouse benefits to the largest visible
group of "non-needy" recipients, although a constructive step,
leaves untouched the principal source of arbitrariness in the
spouse-benefit system. That arbitrariness lies in the provisions that
establish which women (and men) have a sufficient connection to a
covered former worker to qualify for spouse benefits, and in the
related provisions that determine the amount of those benefits.
Those provisions incorporate no coherent rationale for entitle-
ment. A reasonable presumption of need, occasioned by the cessa-
tion of earnings on which the individual was dependent, no longer
explains the statutory pattern. Many categories of spouses are eli-
gible despite their lack of dependence on the insured's earnings at
retirement, disability, or death. Similarly, constructive contribution
for periods of work within the home, invoked from time to time to
107 Congregs recognized that incorporating (albeit for a more limited purpose) the very
eligibility differences struck down by the Supreme Court jeopardized the constitutionality
of the new provision (see text accompanying note 106 supra). It therefore provided that the
exception alone would in that event become invalid. Social Security Amendments of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 334(g)(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 402 note (West Supp. 1978)).
108 Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 3 3 4(g)(1), 91 Stat. 1509
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 402 note (West Supp. 1978)).
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justify spouse benefits, finds no consistent expression in the eligibil-
ity rules.
Under any likely rationale, current spouse-benefit provisions
distribute potentially large benefits to some who seem undeserving,
while denying them to more appealing claimants. This flaw is not
easily cured. The rules can be tinkered with; their history is one of
constant tinkering. But so long as one set of principles determines
contribution and entitlement to primary benefits, while a com-
pletely different set-focusing on family relationships at some later
point or period-determines entitlement to spouse benefits, serious
arbitrariness is inescapable. The following eligibility issues, which
have troubled the spouse-benefit system ever since 1939, stem ul-
timately from that phenomenon.
A. Should All Who Are Legally Married at Benefit Time
Receive Spouse Benefits?
The current legislation allows all those legally married to a
covered worker at benefit time to receive spouse benefits, provided
they meet a limited durational test. For wife (or husband) benefits,
the marriage must have lasted at least one year at the time of
application; for widow (or widower) benefits, at least nine months
at the time of the worker's death.'0 9 The durational requirement
has shrunk to its current insignificance over time. 110 Earlier re-
quirements that the legal spouse be living with or financially de-
pendent upon the covered worker have also vanished."'
This heavy reliance on marital status has two consequences
that pose serious questions of "fairness." First, Social Security pro-
vides spouse benefits to people who have neither been married to
workers over any significant period of contribution nor built up
any significant financial dependence on their spouses' earnings by
the point of eligibility determination. The second "fairness" prob-
lem involves the spouse who, though legally married at benefit
time, has for years had no relationship with the covered worker. A
109 42 U.S.C. § 416(b), (c), (f), (g) (1970). Several categories of spouses need not meet
the one-year or nine-month durational test. They include parents of workers' children and
persons who already qualify for dependent benefits on the accounts of others. In addition,
a widow or widower can qualify by adopting a worker's child under 18, or by joining with a
worker to adopt a child under 18. They are also exempt from the durational test in the
event the worker's death is accidental or in the line of military duty. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 416(b)-(e), (k) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See generally Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749,
767-85 (1975).
0 See notes 37 & 59 and accompanying text supra.
I See notes 33 & 58 and accompanying text supra.
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brief marriage, long since ended practically but never legally, pro-
vides a basis for ultimate benefit entitlement." 12
Both cases involve a flow of benefits to individuals who have
merely "won the marriage lottery." The losers include many others
with far stronger "equitable" claims who have lived with covered
workers over long periods, perhaps raised their children, and been
financially dependent on their covered earnings. To have entitle-
ment hinge completely on marital status seems at times grossly
unfair. The contrast is particularly poignant when a legal spouse
(with a poor equitable claim) and another with much stronger emo-
tional and financial ties to the worker, who cannot, however, meet
the marital status test, claim against the same worker's account.
The next two issues derive ultimately from this sense of unfairness.
B. Should Others--De Facto Spouses and Former Legal Spouses-
Receive Spouse Benefits?
The basic marital test for spouse benefits looks to state law.
The appropriate state is the covered worker's domicile at the time
of the spouse's application or, for survivor benefits, at the time of
the worker's death. A person qualifies if the courts of that state
would find either:
(a) that the two were "validly married," or
(b) that the person claiming spouse benefits, though not le-
gally married for some purposes, would "under the laws
applied by such courts in determining the devolution of
intestate personal property, have the same status with re-
spect to the taking of such property as a [spouse of the
worker]." 1 3
This test permits the happenstance of local marriage and di-
vorce law to control benefit entitlement under a national program.
Two people who have lived as husband and wife for thirty or forty
years, under circumstances that would cause them to be "validly
married" in some states or the equivalent of spouses for intestate
succession purposes in others, can lose out on Social Security
spouse benefits if they lived in the wrong place.'1 4 Similarly,
112See, e.g., Cammarota v. Secretary of HEW, 329 F. Supp. 1087 (N.D.N.Y. 1971)
(wife, whom wage earner left in 1930 after two years, eligible for widow benefits after his
death in 1963 because Mexican divorce obtained in 1942 invalid under New York law).
113 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A) (1970).
114 Compare Sanabria v. Secretary of HEW, 390 F. Supp. 538 (D.P.R. 1975), aff'd mem.,
530 F.2d 961 (lst Cir. 1976), with Goss v. Weinberger, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] UN-
EMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 15,139 (10th Cir. 1977).
The measurement of marital status according to state law dates from the 1939
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whether a first marriage, despite an attempted divorce and remar-
riage, leaves an eligible legal spouse depends on the state's divorce
doctrines, including its recognition of foreign divorces." 5
Resolving these state law questions is often not easy. They
intertwine with influential, if not dispositive, evidentiary presump-
tions (the presumptive validity of a second marriage, for instance)
and procedural doctrines (such as estoppel) of dubious relevance in
the Social Security context. Finally, sorting out a deceased wage
earner's personal history can be difficult. 16
While preserving the basic test (with its attendant administra-
tive difficulties), Congress has, on two occasions, granted spouse
benefits to groups who do not meet it. In 1960, it established a
purely "federal" marital status test that provides benefits to persons
who have married in good faith, unaware of impediments to their
marriages' validity. 17 This special provision, however, contains two
amendments. There is no legislative history for the relevant provision, which is puzzling in
light of the severe administrative problems that the Social Security Board had encountered
under its apparent model. That model, a section of the 1935 Act, authorized the Board to
by-pass paying the lump-sum award to the estate of a deceased worker when the amount
was $500 or less and to pay instead "the persons found by the Board to be entitled thereto
under the law of the State in which the deceased was domiciled." See Rombauer, supra note
58, at 261 (quoting Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 205, 49 Stat. 620).
As early as 1941, the Social Security Board urged a more uniform national test. See
Rombauer, supra note 58, at 267-68. Congress did not yield to this advice until 1960 and
then with a provision more limited than an earlier veteran-benefit analog. See id. at 237-40,
270-73.
1 See, e.g., Farias v. Secretary of HEW, 390 F. Supp. 480 (D.P.R. 1975) (widow ben-
efits awarded to Amelia, who lived with deceased from 1930-40, over second wife Ana with
whom he spent many more years, including those up to his death, because of invalidity
under New York law of deceased's Mexican divorce).
16 See, e.g., Mott v. Secretary of HEW, 407 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1969); Magner v. Hobby,
215 F.2d 190 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 919 (1954); Cox v. Weinberger, 404 F. Supp.
1384 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Little v. Celebrezze, 259 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Tex. 1966); Mincey v.
Celebrezze, 246 F. Supp. 447 (W.D.S.C. 1965), subsequent decision after remand to administra-
tive agency, 249 F. Supp. 421 (W.D.S.C. 1966).
117 In any case where [the applicant for spouse benefits] . . . is not . . . the
wife, widow, husband, or widower of a fully or currently insured individual [under
the alternative state law tests] .... but it is established to the satisfaction of the Sec-
retary that such applicant in good faith went through a marriage ceremony with
[the wage earner] resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but for
a legal impediment not known to the applicant at the time of such ceremony, would
have been a valid marriage, and such applicant and the insured individual were living
in the same household at the time of the death of such insured individual or (if such insured
individual is living) at the time such applicant files the application [for spouse benefits] ....
such purported marriage shall be deemed to be a valid marriage. . . . For pur-
poses of this subparagraph, a legal impediment to the validity of a purported
marriage includes only an impediment (i) resulting from the lack of dissolution of
a previous marriage or otherwise arising out of such previous marriage or its dis-
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provisos that the basic state law test does not include. First, such a
"spouse" must be living with or supported by the wage earner at
the time of death or application. 18 Second, there must be no other
spouse qualifying for benefits under the basic state law test." 9
In 1965, Congress extended benefits to a second group of
non-spouses-namely, "former spouses" legally married to workers
for a substantial period (initially twenty years, now ten by virtue of
a 1977 amendment) but later divorced. 20 Providing benefits to
former spouses, who no longer have either the requisite marital
status or actual financial dependency at benefit time, represents an
implicit but marked shift in justification for spouse benefits. Par-
ticipation in a marriage, presumably as mother/homemaker, during
a period when the covered worker built up a wage record necessar-
ily replaces "presumed" need arising from the interruption of the
working spouse's earnings. This change, more than any other,
raises issues of how to deal with multiple spouses.
C. Should More Than One Spouse Receive Benefits
on a Single Worker's Account?
The 1939 amendments limited the total of dependent benefits,
including those to a spouse, that might be paid on the account of
solution, or (ii) resulting from a defect in the procedure followed in connection
with such purported marriage.
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(B) (1970) (emphasis added).
The good faith requirement receives further emphasis in a provision stating that this
route to eligibility shall not apply "if the Secretary determines, on the basis of information
brought to his attention, that such applicant entered into such purported marriage with
such insured individual with knowledge that it would not be a valid marriage." Id.
118 See note 117 supra.
119 The provisions of the preceding sentence [excerpted in note 117 supra] shall
not apply ... if another person is or has been entitled to a [spouse] benefit ... on
the basis of the wages and self-employment income of such insured individual and
such other person is (or is deemed to be) a wife, widow, husband, or widower of
such insured individual under subparagraph (A) [the state law tests outlined in
text accompanying note 113 supra] at the time such applicant files the application
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(B) (1970).
The benefits resting on this federal marital status test terminate if a person qualifying
on the basis of subparagraph (A) later becomes eligible for spouse benefits. Id. See, e.g.,
Farias v. Secretary of HEW, 390 F. Supp. 480 (D.P.R. 1975); Cammarota v. Secretary of
HEW, 329 F. Supp. 1087 (N.D.N.Y. 1971). But see Rosenberg v. Richardson, 538 F.2d 487
(2d Cir. 1976). In Rosenberg, Judge Kaufman was so offended by the termination of sub-
stantial benefits to a longstanding "good faith" widow because of the monthly benefits of
$1.40 to which the "legal" widow became entitled (she had retired-worker benefits not
quite sufficient to offset her entitlement as widow) that he twisted the language of
§ 416(h)(1)(B) to reach a contrary and insupportable conclusion. Id. at 490-91.
120 See note 64 supra.
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any contributing worker. 121 Further, the reference to state law for
determining marital status assured that in most states there could
be but one eligible spouse. Before Congress repealed it in 1957, the
"living with" requirement combined with the "legal spouse" re-
quirement virtually assured a limit of one spouse per worker. To-
day, the basic spouse eligibility test still limits most workers to one
beneficiary spouse. In addition, the "family maximum" limits the
total of monthly benefits paid on one worker's account at any one
time. Depending on the worker's benefit level, the present "family
maximum" is between 1.5 and 1.88 times the worker's basic
benefit.' 22 If the total amounts otherwise payable exceed the
maximum, all benefits-with the exception of the worker's own
retired-worker or disability benefits-are reduced proportionately
to achieve that figure. 23
The 1965 addition of divorced wives carried with it a complete
break with these constraints. It introduced a significant possibility
of at least two spouses qualifying on a single worker's account and
removed the family maximum as a limitation. Benefits paid to a
divorced spouse are not subject to the worker's family maximum
and do not count against the maximum when it is applied to other
benefits paid on the worker's account.' 24 In 1977, Congress re-
duced the duration-of-marriage test for divorced wives to ten
years, substantially increasing the effect of the divorced-wife excep-
tion upon the family maximum. Theoretically, one worker may
now leave a fair number of eligible divorced wives whose total
claims, combined with those of diverse children and a current wife,
far exceed the maximum.
Because the present provisions still limit most wage earners to
one eligible spouse, except where there is an eligible divorced wife,
entitlement must sometimes be determined in an adversarial set-
ting with competing widows (or occasionally wives) pitted against
one another. 25 The initial task in such cases is to determine the
,21 See note 30 supra.
122 Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 202, 91 Stat. 1509
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 403 (West Supp. 1978)), discussed and compared to prior law in H.R.
REP. No. 702, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 28, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4155, 4185.
12342 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1970). Each child and the wife or widow (wives or widows in
those rare cases where multiple spouses qualify) get their percentage of the basic benefit
amount, up to the family maximum. Id.
141d. § 403(a)(3).
125See, e.g., Mellon v. Richardson, 466 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1972); Olmstead v. Wein-
berger, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 15,322 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
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legal spouse under the appropriate law. 126 In a rare case, state law
may grant someone not a "legal wife" intestate succession rights,
causing her to be a wife for Social Security purposes. 27 This occa-
sionally permits two "widows" to qualify for benefits on one wage
account. As noted above, their benefits, along with those of any
other eligible survivors, namely children, are subject to the work-
er's "family maximum."
Most states do not recognize a second marriage as valid when
either of the parties has a prior marriage not legally dissolved. 128
As a consequence, widow benefits go to a first wife who lived with
the worker for a short period, rather than to a subsequent "wife"
who spent many more years with him including those immediately
preceding his death.'2 9 The "good faith" spouse provision added to
the Act in 1960 changes that result only where the first, "legal"
spouse has not claimed spouse benefits. If the two are in competi-
tion, the "legal" spouse displaces the innocent, de facto spouse. 3 °
How these principles fit together and their ultimate arbitrari-
ness are illustrated by the facts of a recent case.' 3 ' It concerned a
wage earner, Samuel Hunter, and his four "wives." The district
court summarized the relevant facts:
1) The deceased, Samuel Hunter, married Corinne prior to
1920. He left Corinne but was never divorced from her. Corinne
died in 1950.
2) Samuel married Julia .. . on December 21, 1940. They
lived together off and on until 1948 at which time [she] left
Samuel after he threatened her and she never saw him or was in
contact with him again. From 1940 to 1948 Julia had two or
three children, one of whom was not Samuel's. There were never
any divorce proceedings with respect to this marriage.
126 See notes 113-19 and accompanying text supra.
127 In states granting to putative spouses intestate succession rights comparable to those
of legal spouses there can be both a putative and a legal widow. See, e.g., Estate of Ricci,
201 Cal. App. 2d 146, 19 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1962). Both can, therefore, receive Social Security
widow benefits. Cf. Aubrey v. Folsom, 151 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (putative wife of
deceased wage earner entitled to mother benefits, but child by her "former" spouse denied
child benefits). See generally Luther & Luther, Support And Property Rights Of The Putative
Spouse, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 311 (1973); Comment, Rights of the Putative and Meretricious Spouse
in California, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 866 (1962); Comment, The Putative Marriage Doctrine in
Louisiana, 12 Loy. L. REV. 89 (1965).
'
2 8 See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 2.6, at
61 (1968).
129 See note 115 and accompanying text supra.
130 See note 119 supra.
1:1 Hunter v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 123 (M.D. La. 1972).
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3) In 1944, Samuel married Rebecca but they separated at
least eight or nine years before his death. There was no divorce.
4) In 1958, Samuel married again this time to Clara. He and
Clara had had a child in 1953. They were living together at the
time of Samuel's death.
5) Samuel died in 1964. All the events occurred in
Louisiana.132
Although not the typical wage earner's personal history, it is sim-
pler than some for purposes of calculating spouse benefits. Samuel
at least had the decency to do all of his marrying, divorcing, and
dying in one state. 33 Furthermore, he apparently "married" each
of the four women ceremonially.
34
Which of Samuel's four "wives" are eligible for widow benefits,
assuming sufficient age (or age and disability) and low or nonexis-
tent retirement benefits on their own accounts?
Corinne? Corinne did not survive Samuel. Had she survived
him, assuming her marriage was valid under Louisiana law, she
would qualify for widow benefits. The duration of her marriage
(being more than nine months before Samuel's death) is irrelevant,
as is the fact that other wives stayed with Samuel longer or bore
him children. The long separation, the subsequent "marriages,"
that she neither lived with Samuel nor was supported by him at the
time of his death-none of these would have frustrated Corinne's
claim had she survived Samuel.
Julia? Samuel was married to Corinne at the time he "wed"
Julia. Under Louisiana law, therefore, Julia and Samuel were not
validly married, and Julia is not Samuel's widow.
The alternate state law test is a possibility because Louisiana
allows "putative spouses" intestate succession rights equivalent to
those of the legal spouse. In this case, however, the Social Security
Administration determined, on the basis of contradictory tes-
timony, that Julia did not meet the "good faith" requirement of the
Louisiana putative spouse doctrine. 35
131 Id. at 124.
133 In contrast, see Marek v. Flemming, 192 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. Tex. 1961), in which
the court had to pursue the claimant's marital status through the laws of Arkansas, Vir-
ginia, Missouri, and Texas.
134 Hunter v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 123, 124 (M.D. La. 1972). Determining
whether a ceremony occurred can be difficult. See, e.g., Moots v. Secretary of HEW, 349
F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 996 (1966). But even more difficult legal and
factual questions surround nonceremonial "marriages." See, e.g., Mellon v. Richardson, 466
F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1972). See generally H. CLARK, supra note 128, § 2.4.
13- Hunter v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 123, 125 (M.D. La. 1972). Had Corinne sur-
vived Samuel, and had Julia qualified as a putative spouse under Louisiana law, both might
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The "federal" marital status test also requires "good faith."
Although conceivably more lenient than Louisiana's standard, the
federal test cannot help Julia, for she was not living with Samuel at
the time of his death.
Rebecca? Rebecca is in the same situation as Julia. If she meets
the "good faith" test of the Louisiana putative spouse doctrine she
can qualify for widow benefits; it is her only chance. 3 6
Clara? By the time Samuel married Clara, Corinne had died.
Consequently, Samuel and Clara were validly married under
Louisiana law. Even if Corinne were alive when Samuel married
Clara, Clara might still have qualified as a putative spouse. Clara
might also have met the "federal" good faith spouse test, for she
alone lived with Samuel at the time of his death. But this test would
require her to prove good faith and would also leave her claim
vulnerable to the priority of widows (like Julia) claiming under
Louisiana state law, including the putative spouse doctrine. 3 7
To conclude, as the system now stands, a woman who lived for
years as the "wife" of a covered worker and depended upon his
earnings as her only significant source of income, may not qualify
for spouse benefits. Her eligibility rests on such accidents as where
the two have lived and whether there is another woman, perhaps
unknown to her, still legally married to the worker. If such a
woman exists, further accidents, including that woman's age and
Social Security earnings history, govern the later "wife's" entitle-
ment.
One can imagine improvements to the system that would make
spouse-benefit entitlement less accidental, but how much less? The
worker's insured status and basic benefit award usually rest on a
lengthy period of work. During that time there may have been
several spouses, legal and de facto. The inescapable dilemma is
how to allocate spouse benefits among them. The original eligibility
test expressed a clear choice. In specifying "legal spouse, living with
or supported by the worker," it directed benefits to an individual
likely to suffer income loss upon the worker's death, retirement, or
disability. The abandonment of that principle leaves no compelling
basis for choosing who among several "spouses" will receive
benefits-assuming Congress retains an essentially all-or-nothing
system. Nor does any administratively attractive way exist to divide
have received widow benefits-subject to the family maximum. See notes 126-27 and ac-
companying text supra.
136 Note again that were Corinne still alive three widows might qualify.
137 See note 119 supra.
1978]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
spouse benefits among them. Finally, giving more than one of
them full spouse benefits, currently allowed in the case of divorced
ten-year wives, raises a serious question about the system's fairness
to contributors with only one eligible spouse or none.
D. The Remarriage Dilemma
The remarriage dilemma poses a final example of the inherent
arbitrariness of spouse benefits. Initially, benefits for surviving
spouses, resting on the interruption of earnings on which the sys-
tem presumed the individual to have been dependent, terminated
upon remarriage. 1 38 Remarriage, so the logic went, supplanted the
need for benefits with a new dependent relationship. Consistent
with that rationale, the 1958 Social Security Act Amendments
created a complex set of exceptions to avoid terminating depen-
dent or survivor benefits when two such secondary beneficiaries
married each other-the marriage of a person receiving widow
benefits to a person receiving widower benefits, for example. 39
That exception, however, did not significantly ameliorate the
most troublesome feature of the remarriage provision-the finan-
cial loss it attached to the legal marriage of a retired male worker
and a widow collecting benefits on the account of a deceased hus-
band. This potential loss reportedly caused many elderly couples to
"live in sin."' 4 Concern over the perceived inequity of treating
married elderly couples less favorably than those cohabiting with-
out marriage and the resulting discouragement of legal marriage
created strong pressure for the removal or reduction of the remar-
riage penalty.
A major problem of equity, however, lay on the other side.
Without loss or adjustment of widow benefits upon remarriage,
two couples, otherwise identical, could receive substantially differ-
ent benefits. The first, a retired-worker husband and his depen-
dent wife, would receive one and one-half times his primary insur-
ance amount. The second, a retired-worker husband and his wife,
the widow of another (identical) worker, would receive more (two
full primary insurance amounts under the current widow-benefit
percentage).
" Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 201, 53 Stat. 1360 (adding
§ 202(d)(1), (e)(1)).
'See Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-840, § 307(b), (c), (d), 72
Stat. 1013 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(3), (f)(4), (g)(3) (1970)). See generally Califano v.
Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) (rejecting argument that termination of "child" benefits to dis-
abled individual upon marriage to another disabled individual, not a Social Security second-
ary beneficiary, violated fifth amendment).
4
" See R. Lsvy, T. LEwis, & P. MARTIN, supra note 68, at 177-78 n.23.
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Continued attention to the "living in sin" problem led Con-
gress, in 1965, to permit remarriage from sixty on for widows
(sixty-two for widowers) with only a fifty percent reduction in ben-
efits (based on the original spouse's primary insurance amount)
rather than a complete loss.141 Then in 1977, Congress allowed
remarriage for this age group without any effect on benefits. 142
This solution inescapably results in a situation in which widow/
retired-worker and widower/retired-worker married couples can
receive "more than other couples would get where the husbands
[or wives] had an identical record of covered earnings.' 43
Inequity on one side or another is simply unavoidable; it in-
heres in a system of benefits tied neither to actual need nor to
direct or derivative contribution.
VI
IMPROVING SPOUSE BENEFITS AS A TECHNIQUE
FOR IMPROVING BENEFITS FOR WOMEN
When benefit improvement did not carry politically troubling
tax consequences, Congress quite naturally responded to charges
of "arbitrary" benefit denial by expanding the eligible class.' 44 Al-
141 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 333(a), (b), 79 Stat. 286
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(4), (f)(5) (1970)). A subsequent amendment reduced the
age for widowers to 60. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603,
§ 107(a)(3), 86 Stat. 1329 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(5) (Supp. V 1975)).
142 Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 336, 91 Stat. 1509 (to
be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 402). Congress limited the 1965 and 1977 amendments to
widows and widowers. The original 1977 House bill removed the remarriage penalty for all
spouse beneficiaries including divorced spouses. Furthermore, that bill carried no age
threshold; younger widows and widowers, including those eligible for benefits because of
young children, were permitted to remarry without effect on benefits or future eligibility.
H.R. 9346, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The Senate bill, however, did not contain these
provisions or their equivalent, and the trimmed-down version emerged from conference.
See H.R. REP. No. 837, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 73, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4308, 4319 (Conference report).
143 S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 109, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1943, 2049.
In addition, those still subject to a remarriage penalty-widows and widowers under 60
and divorced spouses-may be unaware of that fact or even affirmatively misled by the
Social Security Administration because of a general belief that remarriage does not affect
benefits. Two recent cases-Goldberg v. Weinberger, 546 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 937 (1977), and Terrel v. Finch, 302 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D. Tex. 1969)-illustrate.
Both involve spouse beneficiaries who remarried about two months before their sixtieth
birthdays and lost their benefits as a consequence. The two women asserted that Social
Security employees had told them that remarriage would not affect their benefits. Each
woman argued estoppel, without success.
144 See text accompanying notes 54-66 supra.
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though those times are past, Congress continues to view the
spouse-benefit structure as a device for improving the relative ben-
efit status of women. Recent examples include the 1977 amend-
ments which remove the remarriage penalty on spouse benefits
after age 60 and reduce the divorced spouse durational test to 10
years. Along similar lines, House Republicans in 1977 proposed to
modify the current full offset of retired-worker benefits so that all
those potentially eligible for both spouse benefits and retired-
worker benefits would receive more than either alone would pro-
vide. 145 Without question, such provisions can improve the total
payout to women. Many more women than men receive spouse
benefits. Accordingly, manipulation of the spouse-benefit system
can easily achieve greater equality in gross-more nearly equal aver-
age payments for women. Moving from averages to individuals,
however, reveals the deficiency of such measures. They do no
more than pump additional revenue through a fundamentally in-
equitable system.
The preceding section explored some of the inequities on the
benefit side. More troublesome still, in light of ever-rising Social
Security taxes, are the inequities imposed on those contributors
who reap no advantage whatsoever-either directly or through a
spouse-from spouse benefits. Reforms that improve the value or
availability of spouse benefits either add to those inequities or, at a
minimum, shift their impact.
The Social Security tax is no longer a trifle. Discrepancies be-
tween contribution and return, disregarded at much lower tax rates,
have become economically and politically important. Under these
circumstances, a discrepancy biased against a growing majority of
the contributing workforce is particularly troubling. Such is the
case with spouse benefits. Social Security taxes workers, without
regard to marital status, at a very high rate--currently 6.05% of the
first $17,700 of earnings.146 The system pays handsome bonuses on
behalf of some contributors legally married at the time of death,
disability, or retirement. The terms of those extra benefits give
preferential treatment to marriages that endure (including 10-year
145 See H.R. 9595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1977), described in 123 CONG. REC.
H12,983 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977).
14 6See H.R. REP. No. 837, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 64-65, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4308, 4310-11. The 1977 amendments authorized still higher taxes
starting in 1979. See id. Moreover, widespread agreement exists among economists that em-
ployees already indirectly bear the burden of their employers' tax as well as their own.
See A. MUNNELL, THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 86-87 (1977).
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former marriages) and to marriages in which one spouse has a
Social Security earnings record while the other has none or one
much smaller.
Once the national norm, that preferred group grows less typi-
cal each year. First, over much of their course, most marriages
today are two-worker not one-worker marriages. Over half the
married couples below normal retirement age now report earnings
from both spouses. 1 47 Second, many marriages no longer endure
from the parties' entry into the labor force until retirement. In
1940, when wife and widow benefits began, the ratio of divorces to
marriages was about 1 to 6.148 Currently, it is 1 to 2. Of the
generation currently receiving Social Security, only fourteen per-
cent of women ever married saw their first marriage end in di-
vorce.' 50 For the present generation of young women, evidence
indicates that as many as one-third "may eventually end their first
marriage in divorce."'151 And the heaviest incidence of divorce pre-
cedes the 10-year threshold set by the 1977 amendments. 52 Many
of those approaching retirement age are currently divorced or
separated from their most recent spouse. 153 Third, increasing
'
4 7 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CONSUMER INCOME, Table 73,
at 149 (Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 101, 1976); BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEFT OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 1975-REFERENCE EDI-
TION, Table 28, at 85 (1975); Hayghe, Families and the Rise of Working Wives--An Overview,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1976, at 12. See also M. FLOWERS, WOMEN AND SOCIAL SECURITY:
AN INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA, Table 6, at 19 (1977); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, CONSUMER INCOME, Table 28, at 116-19 (Current Population Reports, Series
P-60, No. 105, 1977). Most data concern the number of two-worker marriages at a particu-
lar time. Such figures are, therefore, lower than the number of marriages that experience
significant earnings from both spouses during their course. See Taeuber & Sweet, Family &
Work: The Social Life Cycle of Women, in WOMEN AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A LOOK TO
THE 1980s 31, 50 (J. Kreps ed. 1976).
'
4 8 See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEW, 3 VITAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1973, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, Table 1-1, at 1-7, Table 2-1, at 2-5 (1977).
14 9 See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEW, 26 MONTHLY VITAL STATIS-
TICS REPORT, BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, DIVORCES AND DEATHS FOR OCTOBER 1977, Jan. 1978,
at 1.
150 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS:
JUNE 1975, Table P, at 16 (Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 297, 1976) [here-
inafter cited as POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS].
151 Id. at 6. Estimates aside, "[t]hree to four times as large a proportion of first mar-
riages have ended in divorce among those now in their late twenties as among those of
similar age 45 years ago." Id. at 11.
152 See id., Table 0, at 13-14.
"' See Murray, Family Structure in the Preretirement Years, Soc. SEC. BULL., Oct. 1973, at
25, 26. The divorce rate among older persons is lower than in the adult population as a
whole but it is .both significant and growing. See Foster, Marriage and Divorce in the Twilight
Zone, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 462 (1975); Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and
Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1202-03 (1974).
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numbers of workers are single, the result of the higher divorce rate
and a greater initial reluctance to marry. 15 4
Despite the inequity and administrative difficulty associated
with spouse benefits, abolition standing alone is not a feasible
or desirable reform. Notwithstanding the increasing number of
women eligible for retired-worker benefits and the added support
of spouse benefits, women fare less well under the present system
than do men. They outnumber men among all Social Security ben-
eficiaries (as they do among the elderly population), but they re-
ceive dramatically lower average benefits (see Table 1 and Figure
2). 155 Nearly half of these benefits are secondary (see Figure 1).
Elimination of wife and widow benefits would exacerbate the pres-
ent sex disparity.
VII
AN ALTERNATIVE: RECOGNITION OF MARRIAGE
ON THE CONTRIBUTION SIDE
A. Retired-Worker Benefits and Women
An acceptable phase-out of spouse benefits requires simul-
taneous alteration of the method of calculating retired-worker ben-
efits. Retired-worker benefits depend on average earnings during
periods of covered employment. Although wage parity between
men and women may lie ahead, in the near future women as a
group will continue to receive lower Social Security retired-worker
benefits because of lower wages. 15 6 There is partial mitigation in
154See generally POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 150, at 8; Grossman, The
Labor Force Patterns of Divorced and Separated Women, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Jan. 1977, at 48.
155 This discrepancy exists even at the bottom of the Social Security scale. The pro-
gram of benefits for "needy" elderly (Supplemental Security Income or SSI) substantially
overlaps Social Security. Of those 65 or over receiving SSI, 70% also receive Social Se-
curity. Women outnumber men among aged SSI beneficiaries more than 2 to 1, but only
67.1% of them receive Social Security compared with 76.0% for men. The average monthly
Social Security benefits of female joint recipients are also lower. See Income of SS1 Recipients,
December 1975, Soc. SEC. BULL., June 1977, at 42, Table 5, at 45.
Because of their greater longevity women collect these lower benefits over a longer
period, on average. The difference in average lifetime benefits between men and women is
significantly less than the difference in monthly benefits. See M. FLOWERS, supra note 147,
at 8.
15M "[I]n every year between 1955 and 1974 the average earnings of women were sig-
nificantly lower than those of men. In 1974, the median income for women who worked
full time throughout the year was 57 percent that of men." M. FLOWERS, supra note 147, at
4-5.
The same disparity is reflected in Social Security taxable earnings. During 1975, the
median covered earnings for women working all four quarters was 54% of that for men.
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the system's "tilt"' 57-lower wage employees receive a better return
in Social Security benefits than higher wage employees-but not
enough to offset the wage disparity. Since more men than women
earn above the taxable wage base for Social Security, raising the
wage limit, as Congress did in 1977, increases the sex differ-
ential.15
8
The treatment of years spent out of covered employment also
affects the benefits retired women receive from Social Security. In
the past, the work lives of women-in contrast to those of men-
have incorporated significant periods out of the workforce, typi-
cally spent in the home caring for children.159 The retired-worker
benefit formula ignores up to five post-1950 years in calculating
average covered wages. 160 Increasing that number substantially or
ignoring all years of work at home would yield higher retired-
worker benefits for a great many women.' 6' A step beyond ignor-
ing years spent at home would be to treat them as producing cred-
its toward eventual benefits-in old age or disability. A few have
proposed, in this vein, that a constructive wage for Social Security
purposes should attach to work in the home, 62 but serious practi-
See 1975 ANN. SuPP., supra note 49, Table 39, at 72. See also Lingg, Lifetime Covered Earnings
and Quarters of Coverage of Retired and Disabled Workers, 1972, Soc. SEC. BULL., Oct. 1977, at
3, 6-8. For a prediction as to the future see Fuchs, Women's Earnings: Recent Trends and
Long-Run Prospects, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1974, at 23.
157 As a consequence of this "tilt," current replacement rates (ratio of benefits to aver-
age earnings) are significantly better for women than men. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINIS-
TRATION, HEW, RESEARCH & STATISTICS NOTE No. 13 (June 15, 1976).
5
'See 1975 ANN. SuPP., supra note 49, Table 40, at 73. See generally Mallan, Women's
Worklives and Future Social Security Benefits, Soc. SEC. BULL., Apr. 1976, at 3.
"' See Malian, supra note 158, at 5-6. See also Lingg, supra note 156, at 3, 6; Fullerton &
Byrne, Length of Working Lifefor Men and Women, 1970, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 1976, at 31.
160 See 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(2)(A) (1970).
"' See TASK FORCE ON WOMEN AND SOCIAL SECURITY, SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AG-
ING, 94TH CONG., IST SESS., WOMEN AND SOCIAL SECURITY: ADAPTING TO A NEW ERA 28-29
(Comm. Print 1975). Such a step would run counter to the present trend. Women formerly
enjoyed three more excludable years than men, but the 1972 Social Security Amendments
eliminated that difference. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977). The present
structure utilizes a gradually lengthening wage-averaging base which will peak at 35 years
(forty minus the five excludable years) by the end of the century. See A. MUNNELL, supra
note 146, at 55-57, 146.
In addition to the five years, which all earners can drop, periods of "total disability"
are excludable in calculating average covered wages. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(2)(C) (1970). Con-
gress could legitimately grant the same treatment for education, work within the home, or
other activities. But the difficulties of administering such a policy seem severe.
16' In 1973, Rep. Bella Abzug introduced a bill containing such a proposal. See H.R.
252, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 44 (1973). For a description, see Note, Sex
Classifications in the Social Security Benefit Structure, 49 IND. L.J. 181, 198-99 (1973). Several
similar bills were introduced in the 94th Congress. See, e.g., H.R. 10750, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975).
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cal problems and theoretical objections surround such an approach.
B. The Community-Property Model
A far more promising reform, which would both yield credits
for years in the home and tend to offset the male-female wage
differential, derives from an existing legal model-community
property. Applying the community-property concept to Social Se-
curity would require splitting earnings credits between spouses as
they are created. Married men and women would accumulate equal
wage records regardless of their respective wage rates or whether
one devoted substantial or full time to nonmarket, "community"
affairs: cleaning, meal preparation, or child rearing. Marital status
would be taken into account from year to year on the contribution
side, rather than only at certain critical points or periods as it is
under the current spouse-benefit system. Credits received as
spouse and as worker would cumulate, not offset one another.
Credits would also remain secure through divorce and entry into
or exit from the labor force.
The community-property states163 have long treated married
couples, legally, as economic partnerships, presuming that income
earned by either spouse is the product of a joint effort. As a result,
earnings belong to both spouses in equal shares.' 64 Since 1948,
federal income tax law has contained a comparable principle within
the joint return, which permits income splitting between husband
and wife.' 65 The marital deduction in the federal estate and gift tax
reflects the same pattern. 166 Similarly, divorce law reform in many
For some of the objections to this approach, see A. MUNNELL, supra note 146, at 49;
REPORTS OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY 42, 189-90 (1975), reprinted in
R. CAMPBELL, supra note 19, at 103, 107; M. FLOWERS, supra note 147, at 22-23; 1977 Hear-
ings, supra note 1, at 580-84 (statement of N. Gordon, Urban Institute).
163 Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and wash-
ington currently recognize community property.
164 The leading treatise on community-property law, W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN,
PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY (2d ed. 1971), explains:
Equality is the cardinal precept of the community property system. At the
foundation of this concept is the principle that all wealth acquired by the joint
efforts of the husband and wife shall be common property; the theory of the law
being that, with respect to marital property acquisitions, the marriage is a com-
munity of which each spouse is a member, equally contributing by his or her
industry to its prosperity, and possessing an equal right to succeed to the property
after its dissolution.
Id. at 2-3. See also Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-spousal Transactions, 19
BAYLOR L. REV. 20 (1967).
165 See I.R.C. § 6013(a).
166 See I.R.C. § 2056(a). In addition, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 changed the treat-
ment of certain joint interests held by spouses so as to presume equal shares, in express
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noncommunity-property states has brought the notion of equal
shares or at least "equitable division" to the dissolution of mar-
riages. 167
Although applying community-property doctrine to retire-
ment plans has proven difficult, 168 logic and practical considera-
tions have compelled the courts in community-property states to
take that step.
Over the past decades, pension benefits have become an increas-
ingly significant part of the consideration earned by the em-
ployee for his services. As the date of vesting and retirement ap-
proaches, the value of the pension right grows until it often
represents the most important asset of the marital community.
... A division of community property which awards one spouse
the entire value of this asset, without any offsetting award to the
other spouse, does not represent that equal division of commu-
nity property contemplated by [the statute]. 169
recognition of the non-monetary contribution of a non-wage-earning spouse. See Tax Re-
form Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(c), 90 Stat. 1520 (codified at I.R.C. § 2040(b)
(West Supp. 1978)).
Welfare programs, including the one most relevant to Social Security recipients, Sup-
plemental Security Income (SSI), also typically treat couples as economic units. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 1382(a)(2), 1382c(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
1'7 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides in § 307 Alternative A that the
court "may, finally equitably apportion between the parties the property and assets belong-
ing to either or both however and whenever acquired, and whether the title thereto is in
the name of the husband or wife or both." UNIFORM MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307
(Supp. 1974-77). Alternative B is for use in community-property states.
Although only a handful of states have adopted the Uniform Act, the principle of
equitable division between divorcing spouses without regard to title is now the law in the
majority of noncommunity-property states. See Foster & Freed, From a Survey of Matrimonial
Laws in the United States: Distribution of Property Upon Dissolution, 3 COMM. PROP. J. 231
(1976). Two recent decisions have gone so far as to provide cohabitants with similar divi-
sions. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976);
Carlson v. Olson, - Minn. -, 256 N.W.2d 249 (1977).
In states retaining the common-law approach in its unaltered form, the spouses' re-
spective assets are not subject to division upon divorce. See, e.g., Fischer v. Wirth, 38
A.D.2d 611, 326 N.Y.S.2d 308 (3d Dept. 1971). But some states use the award of alimony
to achieve the goal of equitable division of property without regard to title. See TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-821 (1977).
168 Applying community-property concepts to retired-worker benefits involves such
difficult problems as determining the point when future and contingent benefits are sub-
ject to inclusion; calculating respective shares in the accrued benefits when the period of
marriage, domicile in the community-property state, and employment are not co-extensive;
and equitably dividing a contingent stream of future periodic payments. See Comment, The
Identification and Division of Intangible Community Property: Slicing the Invisible Pie, 6 U. CAL.
D.L. REV. 26 (1973).
6 9 In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 847, 544 P.2d 561, 566, 126 Cal. Rptr.
633, 638 (1976) (Tobriner, J.).
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All community-property states hold that pension rights resting in
part on employment by one of the spouses during marriage are
community property. 17 0 The issue most often arises during division
of community property upon divorce. It is likely also to arise in
cases of disagreement over the exercise of pension options in states
that provide for joint management of community assets . 7' Higher
courts in community-property states have thus far treated the pen-
sion plan terms-shaped by the employee-spouse's actions and
elections-as a given. They have limited their task to dividing up
the plan's benefits without altering its terms.' 72 Community-
170 See Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272, 569 P.2d 214 (1977); In re Marriage of
Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976); Busby v. Busby, 457
S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970); De Revere v. De Revere, 5 Wash. App. 741, 491 P.2d 249 (1971).
See generally Dutton, The Wife's Community Interest in Her Husband's Qualified Pension or
Profit-Sharing Plan, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 334 (1972); Kent, Pension Funds and Problems Under
California Community Property Laws, 2 STAN. L. REV. 447 (1950); Thiede, The Community
Property Interest of the Non-Employee Spouse in Private Employee Retirement Benefits, 9 U.S.F.L.
REV. 635 (1975).
Courts in noncommunity-property states that divide spouses' property upon divorce
without regard to title have also included pensions. See, e.g., Hutchins v. Hutchins, 71
Mich. App. 361, 248 N.W.2d 272 (1976); Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 375 A.2d 659
(1977); Pinkowski v. Pinkowski, 67 Wis. 2d 176, 226 N.W.2d 518 (1975). But see In re Ellis'
Marriage, 36 Colo. App. 234, 538 P.2d 1347 (1975), aff'd sub nom. Ellis v. Ellis, - Colo.
-, 552 P.2d 506 (1976). In addition, pension benefits are considered in setting alimony.
See generally Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 1421 (1952).
It has been suggested that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) (principally codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (Supp. V 1975)) may now block
such treatment of benefits covered by that federal regulatory scheme. Section 514 of
ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (Supp. V 1975)) provides: "[IT]he provisions of [Title I and IV
of the Act] shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan .... " Arguably superseding provisions include §§ 205
and 206, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1056 (Supp. V 1975). See Note, The Employee's Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974-The Spouse's Interest or Non-Interest in a Community Property Asset, 12 CAL.
W. L. REV. 560 (1976). But see Reppy, Community and Separate Interests in Pensions and Social
Security Benefits After Marriage of Brown and ERISA, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 417, 511-25
(1978).
171 See CAL. CIv. CODE § 5125(e) (West Supp. 1977), discussed in Wagner, California's
New Community Property Law-Its Effect on Interspousal Mismanagement Litigation, 5 PAC. L.J.
723 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1977), discussed in Cross, Equality for
Spouses in Washington Community Property Law-1972 Statutory Changes, 48 WASH. L. REV. 527
(1973).
172 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1976):
As to the claim that our present holding will infringe upon the employee's
freedom of contract, we note that judicial recognition of the nonemployee spouse's
interest in vested pension rights has not limited the employee's freedom to change
or terminate his employment, to agree to a modification of the terms of his
employment (including retirement benefits), or to elect between alternative re-
tirement programs. We do not conceive that judicial recognition of spousal rights
in nonvested pensions will change the law in this respect. The employee retains
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property doctrine has thus not given the nonemployee-spouse or
former spouse a survivor's interest in a pension where the terms of
that pension, combined with the employee-spouse's election, have
not provided any. 17 3 The timing of the plan's payout has also been
left to the employee's discretion.' 7 4 To the extent that courts move
into these areas in the future, they will compound the practical
problems of treating pensions as divisible community property.
Courts have subjected not only private plans but both state
and federal public employment pensions to community-property
treatment. Social Security is the conspicuous exception. The
California Supreme Court recently held that the Railroad Retire-
ment benefit program-a federal scheme which is, in effect, a
single-industry Social Security program-falls within that state's
community-property law.' 7 5 However, the same decision sug-
gests-as the few courts to face the question have held-that So-
cial Security benefits are not subject to community-property
treatment, that they are the separate property of the employee-
spouse. 1
76
the right to decide, and by his decision define, the nature of the retirement ben-
efits owned by the community.
Id. at 849-50, 544 P.2d at 568, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 640 (footnote omitted). But see Phillipson v.
Board of Admin., 3 Cal. 3d 32, 38, 473 P.2d 765, 768, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61, 64 (1970) ("[W]e
hold that when the court renders an interlocutory judgment of divorce after the employee
has terminated state service, but before he has elected the form of retirement benefits, the
divorce court has jurisdiction to require that benefits be cast in whatever form is most
useful to the community."); In re Marriage of Sommers, 53 Cal. App. 3d 509, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 220 (1975) (permitting joinder of plan as defendant and ordering it to pay worker's
nonemployee former wife her share directly).
M See, e.g., Benson v. Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355, 384 P.2d 649, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257
(1963); Packer v. Board of Retirement, 35 Cal. 2d 212, 217 P.2d 660 (1950). Where federal
statutory benefits are involved this result has been held to follow from the supremacy
clause. See, e.g., Harris v. Harris, 94 Idaho 358, 487 P.2d 952 (1971); Fleming v. Smith, 69
Wash. 2d 277, 418 P.2d 147 (1966).
174 There are reports, however, of lower court judges employing more radical meas-
ures including ordering the plan trustees to make a lump-sum payment to the nonem-
ployee-spouse years before the plan provides for retirement payments to the employee-
spouse. See Pensions Land in Divorce Court, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 7, 1977, at 104.
175In re Marriage of Hisquierdo, 19 Cal. 3d 613, 566 P.2d 224, 139 Cal. Rptr. 590
(1977), cert. granted sub nom. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 98 S. Ct. 1644 (1978).17
'In re Marriage of Hisquierdo rejects the argument that Railroad Retirement ben-
efits must be treated as separate property because of their similarity to Social Security:
Nor are we persuaded by husband's analogy to benefits payable under the
Social Security Act .... He claims that the right to railroad retirement pensions is
a statutory right granted by Congress, not a contractual benefit awarded for ser-
vices rendered and that, therefore, his pension does not constitute community
property. He declares that the act is in many respects similar to the Social Security
Act, that the two pension systems are coordinated with one another, that social
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Congress assuredly has the power to immunize federal em-
ployment-based benefit schemes from state property doctrines. To
determine whether it has done so with any particular program
involves searching for legislative intent and investigating the com-
patibility of the federal benefit pattern with the state doctrines in
question. 17 7 With Social Security, the evidence compels the conclu-
security annuities have been held to be statutory rather than contractual in nature
(Flemming v. Nestor (1960), 363 U.S. 603, 611 ... ), and therefore a similar result
must follow with respect to railroad retirement pensions.
The foregoing proposition is unsupported by authority. Although there are
some similarities between social security benefits and railroad retirement pensions,
the same may be said regarding military retirement pensions which we held in
Fithian and its progeny to constitute community property. Thus, we are not con-
vinced by husband's argument.
Id. at 618-19, 566 P.2d at 227, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
Note that it is possible to read that passage as suggesting that Social Security benefits
themselves might be community property if contrary congressional intent is not found in
the federal scheme. In the one recent case to confront the question, In re Marriage of
Nizenkoff, 65 Cal. App. 3d 136, 135 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1977), the court had no difficulty
finding such contrary intent:
The sweep of the Social Security Act is not to be interpreted by the variations
and idiosyncrasies of local law. . . . As Congress expressly provided for the in-
terests of a divorced wife in the social security system, it did not intend that they
rely on state family law concepts of support, alimony and community property.
A ruling that social security benefits are divisible community assets would
seriously interfere with the express statutory scheme of the Social Security Act and
is forbidden by the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (art. VI, cl.
2).
Id. at 140-41, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 191-92. Nizenkoff also concluded that Social Security ben-
efits, being neither a "contractual right [n]pr property interest [Flemming v. Nestor],"
could not qualify as a divisible community asset. Id. at 138, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
In Adair v. Finch, 421 F.2d 652, 654 (10th Cir. 1970), the court summarily rejected an
argument "that since contributions to the Social Security account of the husband were
derived from community earnings the denial of benefits to [a divorced wife who failed to
meet the then governing support test] is a deprivation of property without due process of
law." But see Guerrero v. Guerrero, 18 Ariz. App. 400, 502 P.2d 1077 (1972) (insurance
policy paid for, in part, out of husband's Social Security disability benefits held community
property).
At the point of contribution the present Social Security system rejects the community-
property concept. The system allocates wages solely to the earner's account, without regard
to state community-property law. An even more dramatic rejection occurs with self-
employment income, which presumptively belongs entirely to the husband "unless the wife
exercises substantially all of the management and control of [the] trade or business." 20
C.F.R. § 404.1057 (1977). The latter is one of the points of sex differentiation which the
original administration bill would have eliminated. See H.R. 8218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 310 (1977).
177 The leading decision is Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950), which held four to
three that National Servicemen's Life Insurance purchased with community funds was,
nonetheless, separate property because of federal preemption:
Congress has spoken with force and clarity in directing that the proceeds belong
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sion that Congress intended to specify the distribution of benefits
between spouses at time of death or divorce, putting such questions
beyond state control. Because Social Security already provides for
certain divorced spouses, it is not possible to argue, as did the
California court with regard to the Railroad Retirement pro-
gram,17 8 that Congress left the distribution of Social Security
benefits to divorced spouses to local law. Social Security spouse
benefits do, of course, rest in part on state law, but the federal
scheme's reference is to status not state marital-property doctrines.
The result in community-property states and others in which
division of marital property is the principal method of providing
for a divorced or surviving spouse is that one of the most poten-
tially valuable assets of the marriage-Social Security entitle-
ment-falls outside that division.
In re Marriage of Hisquierdo17 9 illustrates the point. Jess and
Angela Hisquierdo married in 1958. They separated in 1972 and
dissolved their marriage three years later-three years short of the
then existing threshold for divorced spouse protection under the
Social Security program. Jess worked for a railroad throughout the
marriage and would have qualified for benefits under the Railroad
Retirement Act upon attaining age sixty. (He was only fifty-five in
1975.) Angela worked for a variety of employers and apparently
to the named beneficiary and no other. Pursuant to the congressional command,
the Government contracted to pay the insurance to the insured's choice. He chose
his mother. It is plain to us that the judgment of the lower court, as to one-half of
the proceeds, substitutes the widow for the mother, who was the beneficiary Con-
gress directed shall receive the insurance money.
Id. at 658-59.
But Wissner simply frames the issue for federally administered or regulated pension
schemes. Since that case, the Supreme Court has declined to review decisions from com-
munity-property states finding federal military and civil service pensions subject to division
under state law. See In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr.
369, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974); Dominey v. Dominey, 481 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1028 (1972).
Courts in community-property states have tended to read Wissner as involving "unique"
federal legislation. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 674, 535 P.2d 53, 55 (1975).
See generally Comment, Lump Sum Division of Military Retired Pay, 12 IDAHO L. REv. 197
(1976).
The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Hisquierdo (see note 175 supra) is thus a
significant event.
M See In re Marriage of Hisquierdo, 19 Cal. 3d 613, 618, 566 P.2d 224, 227, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 590, 593 (1977), cert. granted sub nom. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 98 S. Ct. 1644 (1978).
But see Reppy, supra note 170, at 499-507.
179 19 Cal. 3d 613, 566 P.2d 224, 139 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1977), cert. granted sub nom.
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 98 S. Ct. 1644 (1978).
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had fully insured status under Social Security so that when she
reached sixty-two she could claim retired-worker benefits. (She was
fifty-three in 1975.) 180 The California Supreme Court held that
Jess's Railroad Retirement benefits were community property-as a
pension arising out of employment for the state or for a private
employer in some other industry would unquestionably have been.
As a result, Angela received a share of Jess's railroad pension,
while hers, being Social Security, was not subject to division.
In marriages with sufficient divisible property and in states
permitting a court some leeway, such inequity can be avoided by
taking Social Security entitlement into account in dividing up a
private pension or other community assets.'"' Even where such
indirect division of Social Security is possible, direct division would
generally be preferable from the standpoint of both the parties and
the court.
C. Earnings-Splitting Applied to Social Security
Ample reasons exist for Congress to retain full control over
the allocation of Social Security benefits. The suggestion advanced
is not that Social Security be made subject to state community-
property or divorce law, but rather that Congress should itself
rework the system to internalize the community-property or
marital-property concept. This would align the program with cur-
rent legal and social trends,8 2 while avoiding most of the practical
problems that have accompanied state court efforts to divide pen-
180 See In re Marriage of Hisquierdo, 63 Cal. App. 3d 231 (opinion omitted), 133 Cal.
Rptr. 684 (1976), rev'd, 19 Cal. 3d 613, 566 P.2d 224, 139 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1977), cert. granted
sub nom. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 98 S. Ct. 1644 (1978). For a helpful overview of the cur-
rent structure of the Railroad Retirement program, see Skolnik, Restructuring the Railroad
Retirement System, Soc. SEC. BULL., Apr. 1975, at 26.
181 See, e.g., Daniels v. Daniels, 490 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973). The same
rationale applies in those noncommunity-property states providing for "equitable division"
of "marital property" upon divorce. Social Security entitlement is surely relevant to a
spouse's "economic circumstances," one of the factors that typically governs such equitable
division. See, e.g., Cool v. Cool, 203 Kan. 749, 457 P.2d 60 (1969); Conrad v. Bowers, 533
S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App. 1975); Claunch v. Claunch, 525 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. App. 1975). See
generally Foster & Freed, supra note 167.
182 See, e.g., Resolutions Adopted by Delegates to the National Women's Conference 16
(Nov. 18-21, 1977):
Homemakers. The Federal Government and State legislatures should base their
laws relating to marital property, inheritance, and domestic relations on the prin-
ciple that marriage is a partnership in which the contribution of each spouse is of
equal importance and value.
The President and Congress should support a practical plan of covering
homemakers in their own right under social security and facilitate its enactment.
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sions between spouses. Those difficulties derive in no small part
from the disparity between the judicially applied "community" con-
cept and the terms of most pension plans, which treat benefits and
the exercise of benefit options as belonging exclusively to the
worker. Social Security, as an essentially universal national pro-
gram, can feasibly avoid this tension by incorporating the
community-property approach directly within its benefit structure.
The change would, of course, pose difficulties of transition, as do
nearly all significant Social Security benefit revisions. But the re-
sulting scheme would be fairer and easier to administer than the
present dual system of worker benefits and supplemental spouse
benefits.
In the 95th Congress, Representatives Donald Fraser and
Martha Keys introduced a bill that would split Social Security earn-
ings records between spouses who elect to file a joint federal
income tax return. 8 3 By mid-1977, the bill had gained fifty-
eight sponsors and the support of the National Organization for
Women.
18 4
The proposal envisions the eventual elimination of spouse
benefits, including those for widows and widowers. Instead, each
spouse would have an independent entitlement to old-age and dis-
ability benefits. Periods without paid employment that a spouse
devotes to child rearing, other work in the home, or education
would not leave blank years for Social Security if the parties chose
to report split earnings. Discrepancies between sexes in work pat-
1'See H.R. 3247, 5319, 5320, 5321, 5323, 8784, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), described
in 122 CONG. REC. E2984 (daily ed. June 1, 1976), 123 CONG. REC. E628 (daily ed. Feb. 8,
1977), 123 CONG. REC. E4717 (daily ed. July 21, 1977).
An early proposal for combining incomes of husband and wife-without detailed at-
tention to the problems of divorce-appears in the classic study of Social Security, J.
PECHMAN, H. AARON, & M. TAUSSIG, SOCIAL SECURITY: PERSPECTIVES FOR REFORM 79-91,
219 (1968). See also REPORT OF THE CONSULTANT PANEL ON SOCIAL SECURITY TO THE CON-
GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS. 33-40 (joint Comm. Print 1976)
[hereinafter cited as CONSULTANT PANEL REPORT].
A plan that allowed combination of earnings by spouses in enduring two-worker mar-
riages, with combined benefits equal to 150% of the amount payable to a single person
having a wage record identical to the couple's combined wages, passed the House in 1971,
but was rejected by the Senate. See H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49, reprinted
in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5034-35; H.R. REP. No. 1605, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
38-39, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODECONG. & AD. NEWS 5371-72 (Conference Report).
For some of the arguments supporting annual splitting of a couple's combined earn-
ings, see 1977 Hearings, supra note 1, at 572-74, 580-84; United States Department Task
Force on Sex Discrimination, Staff Memorandum 35-76 (Mar. 23, 1977) (outlining an
earnings-splitting plan somewhat different from that in the Fraser-Keys bill).
184 See 1977 Hearings, supra note 1, at 572, 592-93.
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terns and wage rates would, upon spousal election, balance out.
Divorce or separation would not threaten benefits for they would
no longer depend on marital status at benefit time. A divorced or
separated spouse would take from the marriage a wage record
reflecting his or her share of its earnings.
Housewives (or househusbands) becoming totally disabled
would, in most cases, have sufficient recent wage entries to qualify
for disability benefits. Under the present system, a brief period out
of covered work, including a period of work in the home, causes
loss of the insured status necessary for disability benefits. 8 5
Aside from the complexities of transition,' 86 such a proposal
poses several difficult issues. One spouse, for example, may earn
well above the contribution base, the other far below it. Should the
split bring more of the high income spouse's earnings under the
tax? The Fraser-Keys bill provides only for splitting the amount
that, on an individual basis, falls under the taxable wage ceiling. 187
As that ceiling increases, as it will dramatically under the 1977
amendments, this issue diminishes in importance.' 88
The system's present benefit bias toward enduring one-earner
marriages, vis-a-vis single persons and couples with comparable
earnings histories, poses a potential political problem of larger di-
mensions. Straight income splitting would likely mean benefit re-
duction for that currently preferred group. The Fraser-Keys bill
retains the present preference by allowing couples who file joint
returns to receive individual wage credits equal to fifty percent of
their joint wages or seventy-five percent of the wages of the higher
paid spouse, if that is more.' 89 The latter option assures the endur-
ing one-earner marriage of retired-worker benefits based on 150%
of the average wage of the high income spouse, just as the present
system yields spouse benefits of fifty percent in addition to the
worker's retirement benefit. Although that preference may seem a
political necessity, Congress ought to be able to ease it out of the
system over an adequate transition period, particularly in view of
185 See 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1)(B) (1970).
186 The Fraser-Keys bill sets a 20-year transition period. See H.R. 3247, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 8(a) (1977). Nonetheless, the plan hurries the transition by counting certain Social
Security benefits received by one spouse toward the other's wage record. Id.
187 See id. § 3(b).
188 Under the 1977 amendments, the taxable earnings base increases from $17,700 in
1978, to $22,900 in 1979, $25,900 in 1980, and $29,700 in 1981, with automatic adjust-
ments thereafter as average wage levels rise. See Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-216, § 103, 91 Stat. 1509 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 430(c) (West Supp. 1978)).
18 9 See H.R. 3247, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b) (1977).
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the growing rarity of the enduring one-earner marriage.
The final issue raised by an earnings-splitting approach in-
volves marriages in which one spouse, typically the spouse with
higher earnings (the husband), is several years older than the
other. Alicia Munnell puts the problem quite concisely:
Consider the case of a male worker aged sixty-five who wishes to
retire but whose nonworking wife is too young to collect her
benefits. With the mandatory division [of credits], the husband
can collect only half the benefits the couple is entitled to and thus
may not be able to afford retirement until [his wife is older]. 190
This situation poses difficulty for earnings-splitting schemes, but
the problem is not, as a few studies would imply, insurmount-
able.191 Congress could lower the retirement age for the younger
low-earning spouse or offer an optional allocation of more than
half the enduring couple's combined credits to the older spouse.
Workable devices for alleviating the hardship are far from un-
imaginable. 192 Conversion to earnings-splitting would no doubt re-
quire coordinated changes in other features of the Social Security
benefits system; it would, in fact, re-form that system. The need for
such ancillary changes is not a legitimate ground for rejecting the
approach if the proposed system promises fairer recognition of
both earnings and marriage and if the transition from the present
worker/spouse dual-benefit approach is administratively and politi-
cally feasible.
Earnings-splitting does not necessarily remove from Social
Security difficult questions of fact and law bearing on whether two
persons are "validly married." If constructed carefully, however,
conversion would drastically reduce the importance of such ques-
tions. The Internal Revenue Service, for example, primarily relies
on the parties' own declaration of status in determining eligibility
to file a joint return.19' The current Social Security system stresses
190 A. MUNNELL, supra note 146, at 50.
"I See CONSULTANT PANEL REPORT, supra note 183, at 34, 59-60; A. MUNNELL, supra
note 146, at 50.
192 Those who reject this form of earnings-splitting in favor of some other reform face
major obstacles in dealing adequately with the problems of divorce. See CONSULTANT PANEL
REPORT, supra note 183, at 38-39; A. MUNNELL, supra note 146, at 51.
193 As a consequence, few litigated cases deal with the test of marriage for the joint
return. Among those, disagreement exists over the test. Compare Lee v. Commissioner, 550
F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1977), with Borax' Estate v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966). Death is more likely to bring a competing spouse
forward, raising the issue in terms of the estate tax marital deduction. See, e.g., Estate of
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such questions because so much-eligibility for spouse benefits-
rides on the answer.
A system constructed without the current heavy bias in favor
of couples with widely disparate incomes might allow splitting on
an optional basis, without regard to marital or family connection.
Any two persons might split their wage credits. Tying the election
to the federal income tax return, however, as the Fraser-Keys bill
does, is not a bad solution. It is particularly attractive if the marital
status on which any year's split record rests will, after a short
period, enjoy a strong statutory presumption of validity.' 94
CONCLUSION
Spouse benefits responded quite reasonably to the mores as
well as the practicalities of another era. They succeeded in fulfilling
the purpose that led Congress to append them to the system in
1939, without serious inequity to contributors and recipients or
waste to the system. In recent years, however, dramatic social,
economic and legal changes have altered the profile of the Ameri-
can family, at home and at work. Since 1939, the Social Security
system itself has grown and changed enormously. In today's envi-
ronment, the current system-primary benefits based on the work-
er's prior employment set off against secondary benefits based on
marriage to a covered worker-functions awkwardly. Its allocation
of noncontributory spouse benefits seems quite arbitrary, and the
tax burden associated with those benefits weighs heavily on the
large and growing portion of the work force that does not receive
them. Moreover, the system's failure to produce benefits for
women comparable to those it yields for men can no longer be
lightly dismissed. To respond adequately to these developments,
Congress must revise the Social Security benefit scheme substan-
tially. Among available reforms, the incorporation of the
community-property concept in the form of an equal division of
earnings between spouses, year by year as they are obtained, de-
serves particularly serious consideration.
Steffke v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1976); Estate of Goldwater v. Commis-
sioner, 539 F.2d 878 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976).
'
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(c) (1970).
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